Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1759915Ab0FJWfH (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Jun 2010 18:35:07 -0400 Received: from hrndva-omtalb.mail.rr.com ([71.74.56.123]:40417 "EHLO hrndva-omtalb.mail.rr.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1759803Ab0FJWfC (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Jun 2010 18:35:02 -0400 X-Authority-Analysis: v=1.1 cv=qXMh5QPBcdVGPlSuovMI3YqffpUTMWPwMqUnXLzRgMM= c=1 sm=0 a=SDFuA76SPYIA:10 a=uEzv4HemXiYA:10 a=kj9zAlcOel0A:10 a=Nqdp4+S2FArj7gZzHVn+tA==:17 a=BulHB4dBAAAA:8 a=5IqlN643HRCgopuUE9AA:9 a=hn0NxtDP_Aat-IpiUzoA:7 a=9POWeKi9L6bj9a3Mu7ho9I4syTsA:4 a=CjuIK1q_8ugA:10 a=B8IJiNHybsEA:10 a=Nqdp4+S2FArj7gZzHVn+tA==:117 X-Cloudmark-Score: 0 X-Originating-IP: 70.120.198.24 Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2010 17:35:07 -0500 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: "David P. Quigley" Cc: hch@infradead.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, casey@schaufler-ca.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, matthew.dodd@sparta.com, trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no, bfields@fieldses.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, labeled-nfs@linux-nfs.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/10] Security: Add hook to calculate context based on a negative dentry. Message-ID: <20100610223507.GA26994@hallyn.com> References: <1276014176-20315-1-git-send-email-dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> <1276014176-20315-2-git-send-email-dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1276014176-20315-2-git-send-email-dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 4044 Lines: 97 Quoting David P. Quigley (dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov): > There is a time where we need to calculate a context without the > inode having been created yet. To do this we take the negative dentry and > calculate a context based on the process and the parent directory contexts. > > Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd > Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley > --- > include/linux/security.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/capability.c | 6 ++++++ > security/security.c | 7 +++++++ > security/selinux/hooks.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 3158dd9..4d01784 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -322,6 +322,14 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) > * Parse a string of security data filling in the opts structure > * @options string containing all mount options known by the LSM > * @opts binary data structure usable by the LSM > + * @dentry_init_security: > + * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available > + * since NFSv4 has no label backed by an EA anyway. > + * @dentry dentry to use in calculating the context. > + * @mode mode used to determine resource type. > + * @ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in. > + * @ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context. > + * > * > * Security hooks for inode operations. > * > @@ -1501,6 +1509,9 @@ struct security_operations { > void (*sb_clone_mnt_opts) (const struct super_block *oldsb, > struct super_block *newsb); > int (*sb_parse_opts_str) (char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts); > + int (*dentry_init_security) (struct dentry *dentry, int mode, > + void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); > + > > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH > int (*path_unlink) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry); > @@ -1795,6 +1806,8 @@ int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, struct security_mnt_opts *o > void security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, > struct super_block *newsb); > int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts); > +int security_dentry_init_security (struct dentry *dentry, int mode, > + void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); > > int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode); > void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode); > @@ -2157,6 +2170,15 @@ static inline int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) > static inline void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) > { } > > +static inline int security_dentry_init_security (struct dentry *dentry, > + int mode, > + void **ctx, > + u32 *ctxlen) > +{ > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > +} > + > + > static inline int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, > struct inode *dir, > char **name, > diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c > index 4875142..9ce1c2f 100644 > --- a/security/capability.c > +++ b/security/capability.c > @@ -134,6 +134,11 @@ static int cap_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts) > return 0; > } > > +static int cap_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + Hi, sorry if I'm being dense, but why do you want to return 0 here, but -EOPNOTSUPP for the !SECURITY case above? Since capability doesn't actually fill out a label, should it not also return -EOPNOTSUPP? Any LSM which does fill out the label should then just make sure not to call the capability hook, but if cap_dentry_init_security() is being called, we can assume noone filled in the label, right? -serge -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/