Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1759888Ab0FJWsl (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Jun 2010 18:48:41 -0400 Received: from hrndva-omtalb.mail.rr.com ([71.74.56.122]:53173 "EHLO hrndva-omtalb.mail.rr.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754151Ab0FJWsj (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Jun 2010 18:48:39 -0400 X-Authority-Analysis: v=1.1 cv=rR912iD8TqKBQWPhXASLR67rt2rT9ApkpBWj5XB9Duc= c=1 sm=0 a=l0vWjkAIsFQA:10 a=yQWWgrYGNuUA:10 a=kj9zAlcOel0A:10 a=Nqdp4+S2FArj7gZzHVn+tA==:17 a=BulHB4dBAAAA:8 a=VnNF1IyMAAAA:8 a=XnEp0smhP56TeH7YzVMA:9 a=RK_Ee4clrYU8xpQspoAA:7 a=W0vlE3hO9951npFOs2A6tzdC5EkA:4 a=CjuIK1q_8ugA:10 a=B8IJiNHybsEA:10 a=Nqdp4+S2FArj7gZzHVn+tA==:117 X-Cloudmark-Score: 0 X-Originating-IP: 70.120.198.24 Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2010 17:48:45 -0500 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: "David P. Quigley" Cc: hch@infradead.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, casey@schaufler-ca.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, matthew.dodd@sparta.com, trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no, bfields@fieldses.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, labeled-nfs@linux-nfs.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/10] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model. Message-ID: <20100610224845.GA27104@hallyn.com> References: <1276014176-20315-1-git-send-email-dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> <1276014176-20315-3-git-send-email-dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1276014176-20315-3-git-send-email-dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 6766 Lines: 176 Quoting David P. Quigley (dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov): > There are areas in the Labeled NFS code where where we need to test if the > attribute being requested exhibits the semantics of a MAC model. This allows us > to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of > something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM. > > Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd > Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley > --- > include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++ > security/capability.c | 6 ++++++ > security/security.c | 6 ++++++ > security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++++ > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 11 +++++++++++ > 5 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 4d01784..9597620 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -1373,6 +1373,10 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) > * @pages contains the number of pages. > * Return 0 if permission is granted. > * > + * @ismaclabel: > + * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name represents a MAC label. > + * @name full extended attribute name to check against LSM as a MAC label. Can you document the return value here? The name does suggestion true/false rather than success/fail, but it would be nice to have it spelled out without having to look at one of the implementations to be sure. Otherwise Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn > + * > * @secid_to_secctx: > * Convert secid to security context. > * @secid contains the security ID. > @@ -1664,6 +1668,7 @@ struct security_operations { > > int (*getprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); > int (*setprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size); > + int (*ismaclabel) (const char * name); > int (*secid_to_secctx) (u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); > int (*secctx_to_secid) (const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); > void (*release_secctx) (char *secdata, u32 seclen); > @@ -1919,6 +1924,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); > int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size); > int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); > int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap); > +int security_ismaclabel(const char *name); > int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); > int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); > void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen); > @@ -2676,6 +2682,11 @@ static inline int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap) > return cap_netlink_recv(skb, cap); > } > > +static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + > static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) > { > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c > index 9ce1c2f..0d8f7e9 100644 > --- a/security/capability.c > +++ b/security/capability.c > @@ -829,6 +829,11 @@ static int cap_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, > return -EINVAL; > } > > +static int cap_ismaclabel(const char *name) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + > static int cap_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) > { > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > @@ -1064,6 +1069,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) > set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate); > set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr); > set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr); > + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ismaclabel); > set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx); > set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid); > set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx); > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index c1b6847..1f0765c 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -1013,6 +1013,12 @@ int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap) > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_netlink_recv); > > +int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) > +{ > + return security_ops->ismaclabel(name); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); > + > int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) > { > return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index 435c51f..8239f5c 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -5372,6 +5372,11 @@ abort_change: > return error; > } > > +static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name) > +{ > + return (strcmp(name,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0); > +} > + > static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) > { > return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen); > @@ -5610,6 +5615,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { > .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr, > .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr, > > + .ismaclabel = selinux_ismaclabel, > .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx, > .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid, > .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx, > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index fdfeaa2..449e223 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -3012,6 +3012,16 @@ static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ > > /** > + * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label > + * @name: Full xattr name to check. > + */ > +static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name) > +{ > + return (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0); > +} > + > + > +/** > * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid > * @secid: incoming integer > * @secdata: destination > @@ -3199,6 +3209,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { > .audit_rule_free = smack_audit_rule_free, > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ > > + .ismaclabel = smack_ismaclabel, > .secid_to_secctx = smack_secid_to_secctx, > .secctx_to_secid = smack_secctx_to_secid, > .release_secctx = smack_release_secctx, > -- > 1.6.2.5 > > > -- > This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. > If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with > the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/