Date: Fri, 18 Jun 2010 09:03:38 +1000 (EST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>,
       linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
       Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>, Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>,
       Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
       Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
       "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
       Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
       "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
       Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>,
       linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ptrace: allow restriction of ptrace scope
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On Thu, 17 Jun 2010, Alan Cox wrote:

> - You can put it together as a security module - which will make people
>   happy and get your stuff upstream. After that you can have a meaningful
>   discussion about stacking

It think this approach is worth pursuing, so that we can also see what's 
there, and determine if there is a need for some form of stacking, or 
whether we can consolidate some of this into library code which the 
various LSMs utilize.

People who don't want to run SELinux / AppArmor / Smack / TOMOYO etc., run 
can still get some protection.


- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
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