Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933927Ab0FRR7V (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Jun 2010 13:59:21 -0400 Received: from smtp.outflux.net ([198.145.64.163]:49070 "EHLO smtp.outflux.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755402Ab0FRR7T (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Jun 2010 13:59:19 -0400 Date: Fri, 18 Jun 2010 10:58:29 -0700 From: Kees Cook To: Alan Cox Cc: Randy Dunlap , James Morris , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton , Jiri Kosina , Dave Young , Martin Schwidefsky , Roland McGrath , Oleg Nesterov , "H. Peter Anvin" , David Howells , Ingo Molnar , Peter Zijlstra , "Eric W. Biederman" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley , Daniel J Walsh , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] ptrace: allow restriction of ptrace scope Message-ID: <20100618175829.GI24749@outflux.net> References: <20100616221833.GM24749@outflux.net> <20100617000120.13071be8@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> <20100616232230.GP24749@outflux.net> <20100617170453.GV24749@outflux.net> <20100617215349.2fac02f5@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> <20100617140630.c6ced27a.rdunlap@xenotime.net> <20100617221815.68ce30c5@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> <20100617215105.GB24749@outflux.net> <20100617233054.330256cf@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20100617233054.330256cf@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Organization: Canonical X-HELO: www.outflux.net Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1419 Lines: 34 Hi, On Thu, Jun 17, 2010 at 11:30:54PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote: > - You can give up now. Failure is always an option! :) Nah, I was never deluded into thinking these patches were going to be universally-loved and easy to upstream. I posted them because I want them in, and I'm going to stick with it. > - You can put it together as a security module - which will make people > happy and get your stuff upstream. After that you can have a meaningful > discussion about stacking, although I think you'll find that stacking > is really really hard because you get conflicting behaviour between > security modules and ignoring those conflicts ends up violating at least > one of the security models leaving you worse not better off. > > Your path to making any of the stuff you want happen is via the security > layer and the LSM hooks. Even if you want them stackable and usable with > other modules your starting point is still a security module. Sounds like this really is the only path, with the idea of finding a chaining solution later. Without chaining, it's only useful for people that aren't using a full MAC. -Kees -- Kees Cook Ubuntu Security Team -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/