Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753514Ab0FWPUf (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Jun 2010 11:20:35 -0400 Received: from mail-fx0-f46.google.com ([209.85.161.46]:52207 "EHLO mail-fx0-f46.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753036Ab0FWPUd (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Jun 2010 11:20:33 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=message-id:date:from:user-agent:mime-version:to:cc:subject :references:in-reply-to:x-enigmail-version:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; b=I3DB9znYY7xzRB6KWUEkfIdbkK3GYxyvCodnJZODiuB0hsbe9mBAYvLP384fAUBzue FW9HDikbDAbPxmGHRuJHXKVkBjJViy+CDQtWejQ/I1Y/80rQuHybFLr508alS4tX7OeM nXwb1JvxJj0+Xhb12QcoAQTR6DRbK4hYFAU2g= Message-ID: <4C222644.4040601@gmail.com> Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2010 17:20:36 +0200 From: Jiri Slaby User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; cs-CZ; rv:1.9.2.4) Gecko/20100608 SUSE/3.1.0 Thunderbird/3.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Oleg Nesterov CC: akpm@linux-foundation.org, adobriyan@gmail.com, nhorman@tuxdriver.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley , James Morris , Eric Paris Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 06/11] rlimits: do security check under task_lock References: <20100513155621.51ca77a4.akpm@linux-foundation.org> <1275855783-27316-1-git-send-email-jslaby@suse.cz> <20100607180855.GA6689@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20100607180855.GA6689@redhat.com> X-Enigmail-Version: 1.1 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3108 Lines: 84 On 06/07/2010 08:08 PM, Oleg Nesterov wrote: > First of all, my apologies for the huge delay. And I still didn't > read the whole series, sorry. Hi, never mind, my RTT of 2 weeks doesn't look like very short too :). > On 06/06, Jiri Slaby wrote: >> @@ -1339,13 +1364,19 @@ int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource, >> >> rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource; >> task_lock(tsk->group_leader); >> +again: >> + retval = 0; >> if (new_rlim) { >> if ((new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max) && >> !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) BTW this capable() has the exactly same problem with being called with task_lock held. Is it OK to move it completely out of critical section? I'm asking because it sets a current->flags SU bit used for accounting. If I move it out of the section, it will set the bit always. >> retval = -EPERM; >> - if (!retval) >> - retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk, resource, >> - new_rlim); >> + if (!retval) { >> + retval = check_security_task_setrlimit_unlocked(tsk, >> + resource, new_rlim, rlim); >> + if (retval == -EAGAIN) { >> + goto again; >> + } >> + } > > Oh. Can't we just ignore this (imho minor) race ? Or just verify/document that > current_has_perm() can be called under task_lock. Actually, I do not think > we have a race, selinux_task_setrlimit() only checks that the caller has > rights to change the rlimits. But does so only if current limits are different to the new ones. My opinion is that we can ignore it anyway. > And. Given that avc_has_perm() can be called from irq context (say, > selinux_file_send_sigiotask or selinux_task_kill), we can assume it is safe > to call it under task_lock() which is not irq-safe. > > But. OTOH, if we are really worried about security_ ops, then we have another > reason to call this hook under task_lock(), and we probably want to modify > selinux_bprm_committing_creds() to take this lock too: > > --- security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -2333,11 +2333,14 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_cred > rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, > PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); > if (rc) { > + /* protects against do_prlimit() */ > + task_lock(current); > for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { > rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; > initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i; > rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur); > } > + task_unlock(current); > update_rlimit_cpu(current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur); > } > } Makes sense to me. > Finally. selinux_task_setrlimit(p) uses __task_cred(p) for the check. > This looks a bit strange, different threads can have different creds > but obviously rlimits are per-process. Sorry I can't see it. Could you point out in which function this is done? thanks, -- js -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/