Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2010 10:16:24 -0700
From: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
       linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] Yama: add PTRACE exception tracking
Message-ID: <20100701171624.GZ4837@outflux.net>
References: <20100630003844.GE4837@outflux.net>
 <20100630073158.GA4453@infradead.org>
 <alpine.LRH.2.00.1007011057520.24202@tundra.namei.org>
 <20100701044401.GY4837@outflux.net>
 <20100701132038.GA24394@hallyn.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <20100701132038.GA24394@hallyn.com>
Organization: Canonical
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Content-Length: 4063
Lines: 82

On Thu, Jul 01, 2010 at 08:20:39AM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> First off, if you consider PTRACE_PTRACEME, and just consider this a more
> finegrained targeted version of that, it doesn't seem all that gross.  So
> maybe that's my fault for suggesting prctl as an easier-to-use in LSMs
> api, bc using a PTRACE_PTRACEDBY might just look cleaner.

Right, this was my thinking -- there is already one kind of declared
relationship via TRACEME (though it's utility is for "pure" debugging).
The other "regular" use of PTRACE is crash handlers, for which this is no
declared relationship.  (If you ignore simple DAC, of course.)  The third
PTRACE use is "arbitrary" debugging -- sysadmins or the like saying "wtf is
that process DOING?"

When thinking about the PTRACE stuff originally, I hadn't realized the
"crash handler" case.  So "pure" was done via TRACEME, and "arbitrary" was
done via CAP_SYS_PTRACE, but there wasn't a clear way to declare the
"crash" case.

> Still, you say 'ptrace is too permissive', but a rebuttal to that is that,
> in a DAC system, ptrace uses what credentials it knows of to authorize.
> *You* can make it more finegrained by not insisting on running everything
> as a single user.
> 
> What you now are trying to do is find a new, natural relationship between
> tasks on a plain DAC system to provide finer-grained control.  The one you
> picked - process ancestry - doesn't perfectly fit, so you add changes and
> make it less clean.  The criticism of that is valid and needs to be
> discusssed.

Actually, if you throw out process ancestry completely, and just use
TRACEME and TRACEBY, everything still works.  The idea would be to just
toss out the old definition of DAC PTRACE permissions.

> One q then is whether YAMA wants to provide task tracking of its own, or
> stack with apparmor.

This is why I asked the question below... I don't want to reinvent the
wheel, but from what I can see, no other LSM can do what I want...

> > Sure.  I am curious, though, is there a way for SELinux (or maybe Smack,
> > since it has more dynamic labels) to declare this kind of on-runtime PTRACE
> > relationship?  Maybe I overlooked some options for this.  I didn't see any
> 
> In SELinux, you could give a debugger or crash handler an unprivileged, but
> allowed-to-ptrace-the-main-app domain.

Right, same for AppArmor.  With either system I can declare a binary as
able to PTRACE another binary.  This is _still_ too permissive, IMO.  I
want a process to directly specify which other process should be allowed to
do a PTRACE.  The logic for this is, by its nature, only known to the
tracee.  (i.e. "Oh, I'm crashing now... trigger handler... allow PTRACE.")

(Though obviously this isn't safe if the crasher handler allows arbitrary
control of the process -- otherwise "kill -SEGV ..." is all that's needed
to subvert the tracee.  The handler by its nature should just collect
details and quit.  It's not a "debugging" case, it's a "crash" case.)

> > I still think simple chaining is the way to go.  I want to review the
> > earlier discussions first (I think Serge said it was in 2004ish?) before I
> > write up anything.  There is, I think, one sticking point, which is
> > /proc/self/attr/current, but beyond that, I think some simple
> > reorganization of LSM initialization routines and a list that security_*
> > walks would be sufficient.
> 
> In the past, output results for each LSM were simply split by \n or a :
> or something, and input was prepended by the LSM name.

This doesn't appear to be true anymore.  Looking at the fs/proc/base.c and
security/selinux/hooks.c code, there is no checking for a prepended LSM
name.  Maybe that's the first chaining limitation -- you can't chain 2 LSMs
that both declare setprocattr hooks.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Ubuntu Security Team
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/