Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932708Ab0KLQxp (ORCPT ); Fri, 12 Nov 2010 11:53:45 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:46102 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932131Ab0KLQxl (ORCPT ); Fri, 12 Nov 2010 11:53:41 -0500 Organization: Red Hat UK Ltd. Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United Kingdom. Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 From: David Howells In-Reply-To: <1289404309-15955-4-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1289404309-15955-4-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1289404309-15955-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> To: Mimi Zohar Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@linux-nfs.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Jason Gunthorpe , James Morris , David Safford , Rajiv Andrade , Mimi Zohar Subject: Re: [PATCH v1.3 3/4] keys: add new trusted key-type Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2010 16:52:59 +0000 Message-ID: <24801.1289580779@redhat.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 8711 Lines: 312 Mimi Zohar wrote: > +enum { > + Opt_err = -1, > + Opt_new = 1, Opt_load, Opt_update, > + Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth, > + Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable > +}; The compiler can generate slightly more efficient code if you don't skip 0 in your enum. > +static match_table_t key_tokens = { const. > +static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > + struct trusted_key_options *opt) > +{ > + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; > + char *p = c; > + int token; > + int res; > + unsigned long handle; > + unsigned long lock; > + > + while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) { > + if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t')) Superfluous brackets round the individual comparisons. > + continue; > + token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args); > + > + switch (token) { > + case Opt_pcrinfo: > + opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; > + if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) > + return -EINVAL; > + hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, opt->pcrinfo_len); > + break; > + case Opt_keyhandle: > + res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); > + if (res < 0) > + return -EINVAL; > + opt->keytype = SEALKEYTYPE; > + opt->keyhandle = (uint32_t) handle; Unnecessary cast. > + break; > + case Opt_keyauth: > + if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * TPM_HASH_SIZE) > + return -EINVAL; > + hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, TPM_HASH_SIZE); > + break; > + case Opt_blobauth: > + if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * TPM_HASH_SIZE) > + return -EINVAL; > + hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, TPM_HASH_SIZE); > + break; > + case Opt_migratable: > + if (*args[0].from == '0') > + pay->migratable = 0; > + else > + return -EINVAL; > + break; > + case Opt_pcrlock: > + res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); > + if (res < 0) > + return -EINVAL; > + opt->pcrlock = (int)lock; Unnecessary cast. > + break; > + default: > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + } > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* > + * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the > + * payload and options structures > + * > + * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL. > + */ > +static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p, > + struct trusted_key_options *o) > +{ > ... > + ret = strict_strtol(c, 10, (long *)&p->key_len); NAK! You cannot do this. It won't work on 64-bit machines, especially big-endian ones. Casting the pointer does not change the size of the destination variable. You must use a temporary var. > + if ((ret < 0) || (p->key_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE) || > + (p->key_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE)) Superfluous parenthesization. > +static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, > + size_t datalen) > +{ > ... > + switch (key_cmd) { > + case Opt_load: > + ret = key_unseal(payload, options); > + if (ret < 0) > + pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); > + break; > + case Opt_new: > + ret = my_get_random(payload->key, payload->key_len); > + if (ret < 0) { > + pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); > + goto out; > + } > + ret = key_seal(payload, options); > + if (ret < 0) > + pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); > + break; Aha! I see how this works now. Using add/update key seems the right way to do things. > + default: > + ret = -EINVAL; > + } > + if (options->pcrlock) > + ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); Do you really want to go through pcrlock() if you're going to return -EINVAL? > +out: > + kfree(datablob); > + if (options) > + kfree(options); kfree() can handle NULL pointers. > + if (!ret) > + rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, payload); > + else if (payload) > + kfree(payload); Again, kfree() can handle a NULL pointer. > +#define TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE 512 > +#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND 193 > +#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND 194 > +#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND 195 > +#define TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND 196 > +#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND 197 > +#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND 198 > +#define TPM_NONCE_SIZE 20 > +#define TPM_HASH_SIZE 20 > +#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2 > +#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6 > +#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10 > +#define TPM_U32_SIZE 4 > +#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14 > +#define TPM_GETRANDOM_RETURN 14 > +#define TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM 70 > +#define TPM_RESET_SIZE 10 > +#define TPM_ORD_RESET 90 > +#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36 > +#define TPM_ORD_OSAP 11 > +#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10 > +#define TPM_ORD_OIAP 10 > +#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE 87 > +#define TPM_ORD_SEAL 23 > +#define TPM_ORD_UNSEAL 24 > +#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE 104 > +#define SEALKEYTYPE 1 > +#define SRKKEYTYPE 4 > +#define SRKHANDLE 0x40000000 > +#define TPM_ANY_NUM 0xFFFF > +#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64 I suspect some of these should be in somewhere like linux/tpm.h rather than here. They're specific to TPM access not TPM key management. > +#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])) > +#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) > +#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset])) > + > +struct tpm_buf { > + int len; > + unsigned char data[TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE]; > +}; > + > +#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0) > + > +struct osapsess { > + uint32_t handle; > + unsigned char secret[TPM_HASH_SIZE]; > + unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; > +}; > + > +struct trusted_key_options { > + uint16_t keytype; key type enum? > + uint32_t keyhandle; > + unsigned char keyauth[TPM_HASH_SIZE]; > + unsigned char blobauth[TPM_HASH_SIZE]; > + uint32_t pcrinfo_len; > + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; > + int pcrlock; > +}; > + > +#define TPM_DEBUG 0 The TPM_DEBUG stuff should probably be in the directory with the sources, not in a directory for others to include. > +#if TPM_DEBUG > +static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) > +{ > + pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); > + pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); > + pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); > + pr_info("trusted_key: pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); > + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > + 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); > +} > + > +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) > +{ > + pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len); > + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > + 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); > + pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); > + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > + 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); > + pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable); > +} > + > +static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) > +{ > + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > + 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); > + pr_info("trusted-key: secret:\n"); > + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > + 16, 1, &s->secret, TPM_HASH_SIZE, 0); > + pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); > + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > + 16, 1, &s->enonce, TPM_HASH_SIZE, 0); > +} > + > +static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) > +{ > + int len; > + > + pr_info("\ntrusted-key: tpm buffer\n"); > + len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); > + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); > +} > +#else > +static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) > +{ > +} > + > +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) > +{ > +} > + > +static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) > +{ > +} > + > +static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) > +{ > +} > +#endif > + > +static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, unsigned char value) > +{ > + buf->data[buf->len++] = value; > +} > + > +static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, uint16_t value) > +{ > + *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value); > + buf->len += sizeof(value); > +} > + > +static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, uint32_t value) > +{ > + *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value); > + buf->len += sizeof(value); > +} > + > +static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, unsigned char *in, int len) > +{ > + memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len); > + buf->len += len; > +} Also these look like internal functions which shouldn't be in the global headers. David -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/