Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933060Ab0KSWf4 (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Nov 2010 17:35:56 -0500 Received: from fieldses.org ([174.143.236.118]:48034 "EHLO fieldses.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932302Ab0KSWfx (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Nov 2010 17:35:53 -0500 Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2010 17:35:52 -0500 From: "J. Bruce Fields" To: Josef Bacik Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs: call security_d_instantiate in d_obtain_alias V2 Message-ID: <20101119223552.GB12783@fieldses.org> References: <1290131575-2489-1-git-send-email-josef@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1290131575-2489-1-git-send-email-josef@redhat.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2284 Lines: 61 On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 08:52:55PM -0500, Josef Bacik wrote: > While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was > getting -EACCESS for no apparent reason. Eric Paris and printk() helped me > figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following > denial > > type=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied { 0x800000 } for pid=1772 > comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 > tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=file > > Turns out this is because in d_obtain_alias if we can't find an alias we create > one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do the > security_d_instantiate. > > Usually we are protected from getting a hashed dentry that hasn't yet run > security_d_instantiate() by the parent's i_mutex, but obviously this isn't an > option there, so in order to deal with the case that a second thread comes in > and finds our new dentry before we get to run security_d_instantiate(), we go > ahead and call it if we find a dentry already. Eric assures me that this is ok > as the code checks to see if the dentry has been initialized already so calling > security_d_instantiate() against the same dentry multiple times is ok. With > this patch I'm no longer getting errant -EACCESS values. Thanks, I can't see any reason that wouldn't work. --b. > > Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik > --- > V1->V2: > -added second security_d_instantiate() call > > fs/dcache.c | 3 +++ > 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c > index 23702a9..119d489 100644 > --- a/fs/dcache.c > +++ b/fs/dcache.c > @@ -1201,9 +1201,12 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode) > spin_unlock(&tmp->d_lock); > > spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); > + security_d_instantiate(tmp, inode); > return tmp; > > out_iput: > + if (res && !IS_ERR(res)) > + security_d_instantiate(res, inode); > iput(inode); > return res; > } > -- > 1.6.6.1 > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/