Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753617Ab0LIPat (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Dec 2010 10:30:49 -0500 Received: from lock.cmpxchg8b.com ([89.16.178.151]:35909 "EHLO lock.cmpxchg8b.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752506Ab0LIPar (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Dec 2010 10:30:47 -0500 X-Greylist: delayed 1423 seconds by postgrey-1.27 at vger.kernel.org; Thu, 09 Dec 2010 10:30:47 EST Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2010 15:29:42 +0100 From: Tavis Ormandy To: Linus Torvalds , Greg KH Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org, stable@kernel.org, kees@ubuntu.com, eugene@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH] install_special_mapping skips security_file_mmap check. Message-ID: <20101209142942.GB9267@cmpxchg8b.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2899 Lines: 85 The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the vdso) skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local attacker to bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting the available pages for special mappings. bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, although I don't think this can be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not to have the security check. $ uname -m x86_64 $ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr 65536 $ cat install_special_mapping.s section .bss resb BSS_SIZE section .text global _start _start: mov eax, __NR_pause int 0x80 $ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s $ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o $ ./install_special_mapping & [1] 14303 $ cat /proc/14303/maps 0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665 /home/taviso/install_special_mapping 00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to 4096. Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy Acked-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Robert Swiecki --- fs/exec.c | 7 +++++++ mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index d68c378..7e8c4b6 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -275,7 +275,14 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm) vma->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP; vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vma->anon_vma_chain); + + err = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1); + + if (err) + goto err; + err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma); + if (err) goto err; diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index b179abb..1de3f4b 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -2479,6 +2479,11 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops; vma->vm_private_data = pages; + if (security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1)) { + kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); + return -EPERM; + } + if (unlikely(insert_vm_struct(mm, vma))) { kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); return -ENOMEM; -- ------------------------------------- taviso@cmpxchg8b.com | pgp encrypted mail preferred ------------------------------------------------------- -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/