Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754616Ab1BBQqH (ORCPT ); Wed, 2 Feb 2011 11:46:07 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:17604 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754038Ab1BBQqF (ORCPT ); Wed, 2 Feb 2011 11:46:05 -0500 Subject: Re: Using ftrace/perf as a basis for generic seccomp From: Eric Paris To: Ingo Molnar Cc: Masami Hiramatsu , Eric Paris , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, agl@google.com, fweisbec@gmail.com, tzanussi@gmail.com, Jason Baron , Mathieu Desnoyers , 2nddept-manager@sdl.hitachi.co.jp Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2011 11:45:22 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20110202122620.GA11427@elte.hu> References: <1294867725.3237.230.camel@localhost.localdomain> <4D494AB1.1040508@hitachi.com> <20110202122620.GA11427@elte.hu> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-ID: <1296665124.3145.17.camel@localhost.localdomain> Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1832 Lines: 43 On Wed, 2011-02-02 at 13:26 +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote: > * Masami Hiramatsu wrote: > > > Hi Eric, > > > > (2011/02/01 23:58), Eric Paris wrote: > > > On Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 4:28 PM, Eric Paris wrote: > > >> Some time ago Adam posted a patch to allow for a generic seccomp > > >> implementation (unlike the current seccomp where your choice is all > > >> syscalls or only read, write, sigreturn, and exit) which got little > > >> traction and it was suggested he instead do the same thing somehow using > > >> the tracing code: > > >> http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/833556 > > > > Hm, interesting idea :) > > But why would you like to use tracing code? just for hooking? > > What I suggested before was to reuse the scripting engine and the tracepoints. > > I.e. the "seccomp restrictions" can be implemented via a filter expression - and the > scripting engine could be generalized so that such 'sandboxing' code can make use of > it. > > For example, if you want to restrict a process to only allow open() syscalls to fd 4 > (a very restrictive sandbox), it could be done via this filter expression: > > 'fd == 4' > > etc. Note that obviously the scripting engine needs to be abstracted out somewhat - > but this is the basic idea, to reuse the callbacks and reuse the scripting engine > for runtime filtering of syscall parameters. Any pointers on what is involved in this abstraction? I can work out the details, but I don't know the big picture well enough to even start to move forwards..... -Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/