Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1760313Ab1CDVqk (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Mar 2011 16:46:40 -0500 Received: from mail-fx0-f46.google.com ([209.85.161.46]:63790 "EHLO mail-fx0-f46.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1760290Ab1CDVqj (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Mar 2011 16:46:39 -0500 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=sender:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-type:content-disposition:in-reply-to:user-agent; b=sgVu1eGgjr3b8l/+HvcsQvdZz+WWNxf/v+tEBcBLa2L6GoRIvyDN/427+lqujR5VZ8 sDWmkNVVgdhbrUEtof+xWzbHy+EwVgQfR4Y/OlIW79uyZXaxuUXJbh9S+TRifVSwXi9p HqUkhj0/SlNoOsRfUCQB6cYKGiE31GoiRa2XA= Date: Sat, 5 Mar 2011 00:46:32 +0300 From: Vasiliy Kulikov To: "Rafael J. Wysocki" Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org, Len Brown , Pavel Machek , linux-pm@lists.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] power: disable hibernation if module loading is disabled Message-ID: <20110304214630.GA29883@albatros> References: <1299255084-4390-1-git-send-email-segoon@openwall.com> <201103042142.09247.rjw@sisk.pl> <20110304211035.GA28842@albatros> <201103042221.02852.rjw@sisk.pl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <201103042221.02852.rjw@sisk.pl> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1978 Lines: 48 On Fri, Mar 04, 2011 at 22:21 +0100, Rafael J. Wysocki wrote: > On Friday, March 04, 2011, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote: > > If modules_disabled is set to 1, then nobody, even full root may not write > > to the kernel, right? So, if something permits to indirectly pass > > modules_disabled restriction, this is a bug. Otherwise, > > modules_disabled is confusing as it gives false sense of security. > > > > -OR- > > > > modules_disabled's documentation should be changed to note that it > > doesn't prevent rootkit uploading, but only forbids modprob'ing modules > > via the "official" init_module(2) gate, disallowing e.g. module autoloading. > > Why not to change that documentation, then? Because it's better to fix something (if it is possible, of course) than simply documenting the bug. > Also, please note that in order to "write" into memory using the hibernation > interface you need to have write access to swap, No, you may just "write the kernel" via write() /dev/snapshot, this is the way uswsusp works. I didn't check whether it really needs temporary file to change the kernel memory or it may be done entirely without disk iteraction. This is irrelevant to modules_disabled policy violation, though. > which you can use to corrupt > memory regardless of the modules_disabled setting AFAICS. Please correct me if I'm wrong, but kernel memory is not swappable at all and only userspace memory is written to the swap. Root with CAP_SYS_ADMIN already may do everything with all processes, so this is not a threat. If one may change kernel memory via swap then it is another problem with modules_disabled. Thanks, -- Vasiliy Kulikov http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/