Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754287Ab1DSJDt (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Apr 2011 05:03:49 -0400 Received: from bombadil.infradead.org ([18.85.46.34]:37999 "EHLO bombadil.infradead.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754105Ab1DSJDr convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Apr 2011 05:03:47 -0400 Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2.6.39-rc1-tip 12/26] 12: uprobes: slot allocation for uprobes From: Peter Zijlstra To: Srikar Dronamraju Cc: James Morris , Ingo Molnar , Steven Rostedt , Linux-mm , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Linus Torvalds , Jonathan Corbet , Christoph Hellwig , Masami Hiramatsu , Thomas Gleixner , Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli , Oleg Nesterov , Andrew Morton , SystemTap , Jim Keniston , Roland McGrath , Andi Kleen , LKML In-Reply-To: <20110419062654.GB10698@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20110401143223.15455.19844.sendpatchset@localhost6.localdomain6> <20110401143457.15455.64839.sendpatchset@localhost6.localdomain6> <1303145171.32491.886.camel@twins> <20110419062654.GB10698@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2011 11:02:26 +0200 Message-ID: <1303203746.32491.913.camel@twins> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Evolution 2.30.3 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1281 Lines: 32 On Tue, 2011-04-19 at 11:56 +0530, Srikar Dronamraju wrote: > > > + /* > > > + * Find the end of the top mapping and skip a page. > > > + * If there is no space for PAGE_SIZE above > > > + * that, mmap will ignore our address hint. > > > + * > > > + * We allocate a "fake" unlinked shmem file because > > > + * anonymous memory might not be granted execute > > > + * permission when the selinux security hooks have > > > + * their way. > > > + */ > > > > That just annoys me, so we're working around some stupid sekurity crap, > > executable anonymous maps are perfectly fine, also what do JITs do? > > Yes, we are working around selinux security hooks, but do we have a > choice. Of course you have a choice, mark selinux broken and let them sort it ;-) Anyway, it looks like install_special_mapping() the thing I think you ought to use (and I'm sure I said that before) also wobbles around selinux by using security_file_mmap() even though its very clearly not a file mmap (hint: vm_file == NULL). -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/