Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754082Ab1DSUE0 (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Apr 2011 16:04:26 -0400 Received: from mail-bw0-f46.google.com ([209.85.214.46]:44784 "EHLO mail-bw0-f46.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753801Ab1DSUEY (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Apr 2011 16:04:24 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=szeredi.hu; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:references:date:in-reply-to:message-id :user-agent:mime-version:content-type; b=mKBWlRDhJHEjWZcYKS42veFqLZQqKQmZXLUL8kv2FQpM21IWThnW5auX3ArRwHaK0V fU7g5WT763sZErV0lC/PjxkwBEbKOiIxCxMyOqhmyGAI6XUG7pMzHSBGMtgkOAeMaBKK VGGNlWOY3sCkOWoj3E92pPEtRDskPFDOhOdxI= From: Miklos Szeredi To: Michal Suchanek Cc: Andreas Dilger , Jiri Kosina , Ric Wheeler , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , Ian Kent , Jeff Moyer , Christoph Hellwig , Hugh Dickins , Eric Paris Subject: [PATCH] tmpfs: implement generic xattr support References: <4DA4B6A8.7030804@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2011 22:04:22 +0200 In-Reply-To: (Michal Suchanek's message of "Mon, 18 Apr 2011 15:31:14 +0200") Message-ID: <87tydu3t4p.fsf_-_@tucsk.pomaz.szeredi.hu> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/23.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 16255 Lines: 531 Michal Suchanek writes: > Applying this patch is not sufficient. Apparently more xattrs are > needed but adding them on top of this patch should be easy. > > The ones mentioned in the overlayfs doc are > > trusted.overlay.whiteout > trusted.overlay.opaque > > The patch implements security.* Here's an updated patch. It changes a number of things: - it implements shmem specific xattr ops instead of using the generic_* functions. Which means that there's no back and forth between the VFS and the filesystem. I basically copied the btrfs way of doing things. - adds a new config option: CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR and makes CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL depend on this. This way xattr support can be turned on without also adding ACL support. - now supports trusted.* namespace needed by overlayfs in addition to security.*. Doesn't yet support user.* since that needs more thought wrt. kernel memory use. - supports xattrs on symlinks, again needed by overlayfs Hugh, Eric, does this look acceptable? Thanks, Miklos --- From: Eric Paris Subject: tmpfs: implement generic xattr support This patch implements generic xattrs for tmpfs filesystems. The feodra project, while trying to replace suid apps with file capabilities, realized that tmpfs, which is used on the build systems, does not support file capabilities and thus cannot be used to build packages which use file capabilities. Xattrs are also needed for overlayfs. The xattr interface is a bit, odd. If a filesystem does not implement any {get,set,list}xattr functions the VFS will call into some random LSM hooks and the running LSM can then implement some method for handling xattrs. SELinux for example provides a method to support security.selinux but no other security.* xattrs. As it stands today when one enables CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL tmpfs will have xattr handler routines specifically to handle acls. Because of this tmpfs would loose the VFS/LSM helpers to support the running LSM. To make up for that tmpfs had stub functions that did nothing but call into the LSM hooks which implement the helpers. This new patch does not use the LSM fallback functions and instead just implements a native get/set/list xattr feature for the full security.* and trusted.* namespace like a normal filesystem. This means that tmpfs can now support both security.selinux and security.capability, which was not previously possible. The basic implementation is that I attach a: struct shmem_xattr { struct list_head list; /* anchored by shmem_inode_info->xattr_list */ char *name; size_t size; char value[0]; }; Into the struct shmem_inode_info for each xattr that is set. This implementation could easily support the user.* namespace as well, except some care needs to be taken to prevent large amounts of unswappable memory being allocated for unprivileged users. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi --- fs/Kconfig | 18 ++ include/linux/shmem_fs.h | 1 mm/shmem.c | 302 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 273 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) Index: linux-2.6/fs/Kconfig =================================================================== --- linux-2.6.orig/fs/Kconfig 2011-04-19 21:09:33.000000000 +0200 +++ linux-2.6/fs/Kconfig 2011-04-19 21:09:35.000000000 +0200 @@ -121,9 +121,25 @@ config TMPFS See for details. +config TMPFS_XATTR + bool "Tmpfs extended attributes" + depends on TMPFS + default y + help + Extended attributes are name:value pairs associated with inodes by + the kernel or by users (see the attr(5) manual page, or visit + for details). + + Currently this enables support for the trusted.* and + security.* namespaces. + + If unsure, say N. + + You need this for POSIX ACL support on tmpfs. + config TMPFS_POSIX_ACL bool "Tmpfs POSIX Access Control Lists" - depends on TMPFS + depends on TMPFS_XATTR select GENERIC_ACL help POSIX Access Control Lists (ACLs) support permissions for users and Index: linux-2.6/include/linux/shmem_fs.h =================================================================== --- linux-2.6.orig/include/linux/shmem_fs.h 2011-04-19 21:09:25.000000000 +0200 +++ linux-2.6/include/linux/shmem_fs.h 2011-04-19 21:09:35.000000000 +0200 @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ struct shmem_inode_info { struct page *i_indirect; /* top indirect blocks page */ swp_entry_t i_direct[SHMEM_NR_DIRECT]; /* first blocks */ struct list_head swaplist; /* chain of maybes on swap */ + struct list_head xattr_list; /* list of shmem_xattr */ struct inode vfs_inode; }; Index: linux-2.6/mm/shmem.c =================================================================== --- linux-2.6.orig/mm/shmem.c 2011-04-19 21:09:25.000000000 +0200 +++ linux-2.6/mm/shmem.c 2011-04-19 21:09:35.000000000 +0200 @@ -99,6 +99,13 @@ static struct vfsmount *shm_mnt; /* Pretend that each entry is of this size in directory's i_size */ #define BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE 20 +struct shmem_xattr { + struct list_head list; /* anchored by shmem_inode_info->xattr_list */ + char *name; /* xattr name */ + size_t size; + char value[0]; +}; + /* Flag allocation requirements to shmem_getpage and shmem_swp_alloc */ enum sgp_type { SGP_READ, /* don't exceed i_size, don't allocate page */ @@ -822,6 +829,7 @@ static int shmem_notify_change(struct de static void shmem_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) { struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode); + struct shmem_xattr *xattr, *nxattr; if (inode->i_mapping->a_ops == &shmem_aops) { truncate_inode_pages(inode->i_mapping, 0); @@ -834,6 +842,11 @@ static void shmem_evict_inode(struct ino mutex_unlock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex); } } + + list_for_each_entry_safe(xattr, nxattr, &info->xattr_list, list) { + kfree(xattr->name); + kfree(xattr); + } BUG_ON(inode->i_blocks); shmem_free_inode(inode->i_sb); end_writeback(inode); @@ -1597,6 +1610,7 @@ static struct inode *shmem_get_inode(str spin_lock_init(&info->lock); info->flags = flags & VM_NORESERVE; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&info->swaplist); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&info->xattr_list); cache_no_acl(inode); switch (mode & S_IFMT) { @@ -2048,62 +2062,225 @@ static void shmem_put_link(struct dentry } } -static const struct inode_operations shmem_symlink_inline_operations = { - .readlink = generic_readlink, - .follow_link = shmem_follow_link_inline, -}; - -static const struct inode_operations shmem_symlink_inode_operations = { - .readlink = generic_readlink, - .follow_link = shmem_follow_link, - .put_link = shmem_put_link, -}; - -#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL +#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR /* - * Superblocks without xattr inode operations will get security.* xattr - * support from the VFS "for free". As soon as we have any other xattrs + * Superblocks without xattr inode operations may get some security.* xattr + * support from the LSM "for free". As soon as we have any other xattrs * like ACLs, we also need to implement the security.* handlers at * filesystem level, though. */ -static size_t shmem_xattr_security_list(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, - size_t list_len, const char *name, - size_t name_len, int handler_flags) +static int shmem_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + void *buffer, size_t size) { - return security_inode_listsecurity(dentry->d_inode, list, list_len); -} + struct shmem_inode_info *info; + struct shmem_xattr *xattr; + int ret = -ENODATA; -static int shmem_xattr_security_get(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - void *buffer, size_t size, int handler_flags) -{ - if (strcmp(name, "") == 0) - return -EINVAL; - return xattr_getsecurity(dentry->d_inode, name, buffer, size); + info = SHMEM_I(dentry->d_inode); + + spin_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_lock); + list_for_each_entry(xattr, &info->xattr_list, list) { + if (strcmp(name, xattr->name)) + continue; + + ret = xattr->size; + if (buffer) { + if (size < xattr->size) + ret = -ERANGE; + else + memcpy(buffer, xattr->value, xattr->size); + } + break; + } + spin_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_lock); + return ret; } -static int shmem_xattr_security_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, int flags, int handler_flags) +static int shmem_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { - if (strcmp(name, "") == 0) - return -EINVAL; - return security_inode_setsecurity(dentry->d_inode, name, value, - size, flags); + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode); + struct shmem_xattr *xattr; + struct shmem_xattr *new_xattr = NULL; + size_t len; + int err = 0; + + /* value == NULL means remove */ + if (value) { + /* wrap around? */ + len = sizeof(*new_xattr) + size; + if (len <= sizeof(*new_xattr)) + return -ENOMEM; + + new_xattr = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS); + if (!new_xattr) + return -ENOMEM; + + new_xattr->name = kstrdup(name, GFP_NOFS); + if (!new_xattr->name) { + kfree(new_xattr); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + new_xattr->size = size; + memcpy(new_xattr->value, value, size); + } + + spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); + list_for_each_entry(xattr, &info->xattr_list, list) { + if (!strcmp(name, xattr->name)) { + if (flags & XATTR_CREATE) { + xattr = new_xattr; + err = -EEXIST; + } else if (new_xattr) { + list_replace(&xattr->list, &new_xattr->list); + } else { + list_del(&xattr->list); + } + goto out; + } + } + if (flags & XATTR_REPLACE) { + xattr = new_xattr; + err = -ENODATA; + } else { + list_add(&new_xattr->list, &info->xattr_list); + xattr = NULL; + } +out: + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + if (xattr) + kfree(xattr->name); + kfree(xattr); + return 0; } -static const struct xattr_handler shmem_xattr_security_handler = { - .prefix = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, - .list = shmem_xattr_security_list, - .get = shmem_xattr_security_get, - .set = shmem_xattr_security_set, -}; static const struct xattr_handler *shmem_xattr_handlers[] = { +#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL &generic_acl_access_handler, &generic_acl_default_handler, - &shmem_xattr_security_handler, +#endif NULL }; + +static int shmem_xattr_validate(const char *name) +{ + struct { const char *prefix; size_t len; } arr[] = { + { XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN }, + { XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN }}; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(arr); i++) { + size_t preflen = arr[i].len; + if (strncmp(name, arr[i].prefix, preflen) == 0) { + if (!name[preflen]) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; + } + } + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static ssize_t shmem_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + void *buffer, size_t size) +{ + int err; + + /* + * If this is a request for a synthetic attribute in the system.* + * namespace use the generic infrastructure to resolve a handler + * for it via sb->s_xattr. + */ + if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN)) + return generic_getxattr(dentry, name, buffer, size); + + err = shmem_xattr_validate(name); + if (err) + return err; + + return shmem_xattr_get(dentry, name, buffer, size); +} + +static int shmem_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + int err; + + /* + * If this is a request for a synthetic attribute in the system.* + * namespace use the generic infrastructure to resolve a handler + * for it via sb->s_xattr. + */ + if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN)) + return generic_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); + + err = shmem_xattr_validate(name); + if (err) + return err; + + if (size == 0) + value = ""; /* empty EA, do not remove */ + + return shmem_xattr_set(dentry, name, value, size, flags); + +} + +static int shmem_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +{ + int err; + + /* + * If this is a request for a synthetic attribute in the system.* + * namespace use the generic infrastructure to resolve a handler + * for it via sb->s_xattr. + */ + if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN)) + return generic_removexattr(dentry, name); + + err = shmem_xattr_validate(name); + if (err) + return err; + + return shmem_xattr_set(dentry, name, NULL, 0, XATTR_REPLACE); +} + +static bool xattr_is_trusted(const char *name) +{ + return !strncmp(name, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN); +} + +static ssize_t shmem_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t size) +{ + bool trusted = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + struct shmem_xattr *xattr; + struct shmem_inode_info *info; + size_t used = 0; + + info = SHMEM_I(dentry->d_inode); + + spin_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_lock); + list_for_each_entry(xattr, &info->xattr_list, list) { + /* skip "trusted." attributes for unprivileged callers */ + if (!trusted && xattr_is_trusted(xattr->name)) + continue; + + used += strlen(xattr->name) + 1; + if (buffer) { + if (size < used) { + used = -ERANGE; + break; + } + strncpy(buffer, xattr->name, strlen(xattr->name) + 1); + buffer += strlen(xattr->name) + 1; + } + } + spin_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_lock); + + return used; +} #endif static struct dentry *shmem_get_parent(struct dentry *child) @@ -2384,8 +2561,10 @@ int shmem_fill_super(struct super_block sb->s_magic = TMPFS_MAGIC; sb->s_op = &shmem_ops; sb->s_time_gran = 1; -#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL +#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR sb->s_xattr = shmem_xattr_handlers; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL sb->s_flags |= MS_POSIXACL; #endif @@ -2483,16 +2662,41 @@ static const struct file_operations shme static const struct inode_operations shmem_inode_operations = { .setattr = shmem_notify_change, .truncate_range = shmem_truncate_range, +#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR + .setxattr = shmem_setxattr, + .getxattr = shmem_getxattr, + .listxattr = shmem_listxattr, + .removexattr = shmem_removexattr, +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL - .setxattr = generic_setxattr, - .getxattr = generic_getxattr, - .listxattr = generic_listxattr, - .removexattr = generic_removexattr, .check_acl = generic_check_acl, #endif }; +static const struct inode_operations shmem_symlink_inline_operations = { + .readlink = generic_readlink, + .follow_link = shmem_follow_link_inline, +#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR + .setxattr = shmem_setxattr, + .getxattr = shmem_getxattr, + .listxattr = shmem_listxattr, + .removexattr = shmem_removexattr, +#endif +}; + +static const struct inode_operations shmem_symlink_inode_operations = { + .readlink = generic_readlink, + .follow_link = shmem_follow_link, + .put_link = shmem_put_link, +#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR + .setxattr = shmem_setxattr, + .getxattr = shmem_getxattr, + .listxattr = shmem_listxattr, + .removexattr = shmem_removexattr, +#endif +}; + static const struct inode_operations shmem_dir_inode_operations = { #ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS .create = shmem_create, @@ -2505,23 +2709,27 @@ static const struct inode_operations shm .mknod = shmem_mknod, .rename = shmem_rename, #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL - .setattr = shmem_notify_change, +#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR .setxattr = generic_setxattr, .getxattr = generic_getxattr, .listxattr = generic_listxattr, .removexattr = generic_removexattr, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL + .setattr = shmem_notify_change, .check_acl = generic_check_acl, #endif }; static const struct inode_operations shmem_special_inode_operations = { -#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL - .setattr = shmem_notify_change, +#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR .setxattr = generic_setxattr, .getxattr = generic_getxattr, .listxattr = generic_listxattr, .removexattr = generic_removexattr, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL + .setattr = shmem_notify_change, .check_acl = generic_check_acl, #endif }; -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/