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Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 04:40:03 +0100
From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kees.cook@canonical.com,
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        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
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        Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/7] seccomp_filter: add process state reporting
Message-ID: <20110428034003.GG9487@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
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On Wed, Apr 27, 2011 at 10:24:20PM -0500, Will Drewry wrote:

> Definitely.  Would it make sense to have /proc/<pid>/seccomp and
> /proc/<pid>/seccomp_filter?

Just one question: WTF bother with S_IRUSR?  Note that it's absolutely
_useless_ in procfs; any kind of permission checks must be done in
read(2) time since doing it in open(2) is worthless.  Consider execve()
on suid binary; oops, there goes your uid and there goes the effect
of checks done by open(2).  And if you *do* checks in read(2), why bother
duplicating them in open(2)?
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