Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752863Ab1EQIxn (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 May 2011 04:53:43 -0400 Received: from mx2.mail.elte.hu ([157.181.151.9]:49676 "EHLO mx2.mail.elte.hu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752084Ab1EQIxm (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 May 2011 04:53:42 -0400 Date: Tue, 17 May 2011 10:53:27 +0200 From: Ingo Molnar To: Huang Ying Cc: Don Zickus , huang ying , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , Andi Kleen , Robert Richter , Andi Kleen , Borislav Petkov Subject: Re: [RFC] x86, NMI, Treat unknown NMI as hardware error Message-ID: <20110517085327.GG22093@elte.hu> References: <1305275018-20596-1-git-send-email-ying.huang@intel.com> <20110513124523.GM13984@redhat.com> <20110513130011.GA6474@elte.hu> <20110513152033.GB3854@elte.hu> <20110513160029.GD31888@redhat.com> <20110516112934.GE19837@elte.hu> <4DD22692.7050209@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <4DD22692.7050209@intel.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-08-17) X-ELTE-SpamScore: -2.0 X-ELTE-SpamLevel: X-ELTE-SpamCheck: no X-ELTE-SpamVersion: ELTE 2.0 X-ELTE-SpamCheck-Details: score=-2.0 required=5.9 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=no SpamAssassin version=3.3.1 -2.0 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% [score: 0.0000] Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3934 Lines: 95 * Huang Ying wrote: > On 05/16/2011 07:29 PM, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > > > * Don Zickus wrote: > > > >> On Fri, May 13, 2011 at 05:20:33PM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote: > >>> > >>> * huang ying wrote: > >>> > >>>>> What should be done instead is to add an event for unknown NMIs, which can > >>>>> then be processed by the RAS daemon to implement policy. > >>>>> > >>>>> By using 'active' event filters it could even be set on a system to panic > >>>>> the box by default. > >>>> > >>>> If there is real fatal hardware error, maybe we have no luxury to go from NMI > >>>> handler to user space RAS daemon to determine what to do. System may explode, > >>>> bad data may go to disk before that. > >>> > >>> That is why i suggested: > >>> > >>> > > By using 'active' event filters it could even be set on a system to panic > >>> > > the box by default. > >>> > >>> event filters are evaluated in the kernel, so the panic could be instantaneous, > >>> without the event having to reach user-space. > >> > >> Interesting. Question though, what do you mean by 'event filtering'. Is > >> that different then setting 'unknown_nmi_panic' panic on the commandline or > >> procfs? > >> > >> Or are you suggesting something like registering another callback on the > >> die_chain that looks for DIE_NMIUNKNOWN as the event, swallows them and > >> implements the policy? That way only on HEST related platforms would > >> register them while others would keep the default of 'Dazed and confused' > >> messages? > > > > The idea is that "event filters", which are an existing upstream feature and > > which can be used in rather flexible ways: > > > > http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/4/27/660 > > > > Could be used to trigger non-standard policy action as well - such as to panic > > the box. > > > > This would replace various very limited /debugfs and /sys event filtering hacks > > (and hardcoded policies) such as arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c, and > > it would allow nonstandard behavior like 'panic the box on unknown NMIs' as > > well. > > > > This could be set by the RAS daemon, and it could be propagated to the kernel > > boot line as well, where event filter syntax would look like this: > > > > events=nmi::unknown"if (reason == 0) panic();" > > > > (Where the 'reason' field of the NMI event is the current legacy 'reason' value > > there.) > > > > The filter code would have to be modified to be able to recognize the panic() > > bit, but that's desirable anyway and it is a one-time effort. > > > > This: > > > > events=nmi::unknown:"if (reason == 0) ignore();" > > > > would be a possible outcome as well, on certain boxes - to skip certain events. > > We can determine whether NMI is unknown in kernel now. If you want to push > all unknown NMI logic into user space (although I don't think that is the > best solution), is it not sufficient that just check system in user space > (via PCI ID or DMI ID, etc) and set existing "unknown_nmi_panic" accordingly? yeah - no need to push the 'reason' if it's not needed. We want the kernel defaults to be sane - i.e. this is not to 'push' anything to user-space in a forced way, this is to make *optional*, different policy action possible to configure. For example the weird hack in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c would be handled via a set of default filters. The debugfs mce-severity hack API would go away, it could all be configured in the same way (and more) by using persistent events and such active filters. That's roughly the direction the MCE code should take IMO. Thanks, Ingo -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/