Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S935437Ab1ETSnP (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 May 2011 14:43:15 -0400 Received: from mx3.mail.elte.hu ([157.181.1.138]:50759 "EHLO mx3.mail.elte.hu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933661Ab1ETSnL (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 May 2011 14:43:11 -0400 Date: Fri, 20 May 2011 20:42:54 +0200 From: Ingo Molnar To: Dan Rosenberg Cc: Kees Cook , Linus Torvalds , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, davej@redhat.com, davem@davemloft.net, eranian@google.com, adobriyan@gmail.com, penberg@kernel.org Subject: Re: [BUG] perf: bogus correlation of kernel symbols Message-ID: <20110520184254.GB18322@elte.hu> References: <1305293345.1949.22.camel@dan> <20110516153527.GC21107@elte.hu> <1305852966.3005.19.camel@dan> <20110520120750.GJ14745@elte.hu> <1305896093.3005.24.camel@dan> <20110520131108.GA17699@elte.hu> <1305913261.20623.12.camel@dan> <20110520182705.GU25448@outflux.net> <1305916484.20623.23.camel@dan> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1305916484.20623.23.camel@dan> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-08-17) X-ELTE-SpamScore: -2.0 X-ELTE-SpamLevel: X-ELTE-SpamCheck: no X-ELTE-SpamVersion: ELTE 2.0 X-ELTE-SpamCheck-Details: score=-2.0 required=5.9 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=no SpamAssassin version=3.3.1 -2.0 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% [score: 0.0000] Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1161 Lines: 26 * Dan Rosenberg wrote: > At least one distro (Red Hat) ships with panic_on_oops enabled by default, so > attackers don't get more than one chance. Likewise, vulnerabilities in > interrupt context will only have one chance, as will any issue where failed > exploitation prevents subsequent attempts, as is frequently the case due to > failures to clean up locking primitives on an OOPS. So it's basically a last line of defense: the attacker has to assume the risk of the attack being detected. That has a chilling effect on some types of attacks: especially those where the attacker goes against a high value target with a zero day kernel exploit. Risking a crash does not just mean possibly alerting the target, but also means possibly losing the zero-day exploit - if that oops log gets to a kernel developer who starts wondering about the weird backtrace. Thanks, Ingo -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/