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Date: Wed, 25 May 2011 16:38:06 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: C Anthony Risinger <anthony@xtfx.me>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Linux Containers <containers@lists.osdl.org>, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Namespace file descriptors for 2.6.40
Message-ID: <20110525213806.GA4590@mail.hallyn.com>
References: <m1wrhh3z62.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org>
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Quoting C Anthony Risinger (anthony@xtfx.me):
> On Mon, May 23, 2011 at 4:05 PM, Eric W. Biederman
> <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
> >
> > This tree adds the files /proc/<pid>/ns/net, /proc/<pid>/ns/ipc,
> > /proc/<pid>/ns/uts that can be opened to refer to the namespaces of a
> > process at the time those files are opened, and can be bind mounted to
> > keep the specified namespace alive without a process.
> >
> > This tree adds the setns system call that can be used to change the
> > specified namespace of a process to the namespace specified by a system
> > call.
> 
> i just have a quick question regarding these, apologies if wrong place
> to respond -- i trimmed to lists only.
> 
> if i understand correctly, mount namespaces (for example), allow one
> to build such constructs as "private /tmp" and similar that even
> `root` cannot access ... and there are many reasons `root` does not
> deserve to completely know/interact with user processes (FUSE makes a
> good example ... just because i [user] have SSH access to a machine,
> why should `root`?)
> 
> would these /proc additions break such guarantees?  IOW, would it now
> become possible for `root` to inject stuff into my private namespaces,
> and/or has these guarantees never existed and i am mistaken?  is there
> any kind of ACL mechanism that endows the origin process (or similar)
> with the ability to dictate who can hold and/or interact with these
> references?

If for instance you have a file open in your private /tmp, then root
in another mounts ns can open the file through /proc/$$/fd/N anyway.
If it's a directory, he can now traverse the whole fs.

-serge
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