Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932171Ab1EYVzY (ORCPT ); Wed, 25 May 2011 17:55:24 -0400 Received: from mail-qw0-f46.google.com ([209.85.216.46]:39433 "EHLO mail-qw0-f46.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753272Ab1EYVzX convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Wed, 25 May 2011 17:55:23 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=xtfx.me; s=google; h=mime-version:x-originating-ip:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-type:content-transfer-encoding; b=A9Ik5lyh+9Zv9Ag+57mpkKwY7hfIHwOclWi9SsyXbBJyFUo8pmiBn9MU2nXfXOWyFg 2TEDppU86It53F2rW6XgYQITQn4URb6i2qHHehmiQFFlRYaLKNEyg/eMBMUa83Unx2jt 0yvGWfnZoPeEx8TZLUl3z/BuUyyRLtKoHkGmk= MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [98.103.195.251] In-Reply-To: <20110525213806.GA4590@mail.hallyn.com> References: <20110525213806.GA4590@mail.hallyn.com> From: C Anthony Risinger Date: Wed, 25 May 2011 16:55:02 -0500 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Namespace file descriptors for 2.6.40 To: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" , Linux Containers , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2532 Lines: 51 On Wed, May 25, 2011 at 4:38 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting C Anthony Risinger (anthony@xtfx.me): >> On Mon, May 23, 2011 at 4:05 PM, Eric W. Biederman >> wrote: >> > >> > This tree adds the files /proc//ns/net, /proc//ns/ipc, >> > /proc//ns/uts that can be opened to refer to the namespaces of a >> > process at the time those files are opened, and can be bind mounted to >> > keep the specified namespace alive without a process. >> > >> > This tree adds the setns system call that can be used to change the >> > specified namespace of a process to the namespace specified by a system >> > call. >> >> i just have a quick question regarding these, apologies if wrong place >> to respond -- i trimmed to lists only. >> >> if i understand correctly, mount namespaces (for example), allow one >> to build such constructs as "private /tmp" and similar that even >> `root` cannot access ... and there are many reasons `root` does not >> deserve to completely know/interact with user processes (FUSE makes a >> good example ... just because i [user] have SSH access to a machine, >> why should `root`?) >> >> would these /proc additions break such guarantees?  IOW, would it now >> become possible for `root` to inject stuff into my private namespaces, >> and/or has these guarantees never existed and i am mistaken?  is there >> any kind of ACL mechanism that endows the origin process (or similar) >> with the ability to dictate who can hold and/or interact with these >> references? > > If for instance you have a file open in your private /tmp, then root > in another mounts ns can open the file through /proc/$$/fd/N anyway. > If it's a directory, he can now traverse the whole fs. aaah right :-( ... there's always another way isn't there ... curse you Linux for being so flexible! (just kidding baby i love you) this seems like a more fundamental issue then? or should i not expect to be able to achieve separation like this? i ask in the context of OS virt via cgroups + namespaces, eg. LXC et al, because i'm about to perform a massive overhaul to our crusty sub-2.6.18 infrastructure and i've used/followed these technologies for couple years now ... and it's starting to feel like "the right time". C Anthony -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/