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Date: Thu, 26 May 2011 11:57:51 +0300
Message-ID: <BANLkTind9dUu3=OkSjXrkmrh5ik6xxT=vw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering
From: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
To: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        gnatapov@redhat.com, Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
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Hi Avi,

On Thu, May 26, 2011 at 11:49 AM, Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> wrote:
> You mean each thread will have a different security context? ?I don't see
> the point. ?All threads share all of memory so it would be trivial for one
> thread to exploit another and gain all of its privileges.

So how would that happen? I'm assuming that once the security context
has been set up for a thread, you're not able to change it after that.
You'd be able to exploit other threads through shared memory but how
would you gain privileges?

                        Pekka
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