Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1758167Ab1EZSjI (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 May 2011 14:39:08 -0400 Received: from ksp.mff.cuni.cz ([195.113.26.206]:38245 "EHLO atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753523Ab1EZSjE (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 May 2011 14:39:04 -0400 Date: Thu, 26 May 2011 20:38:50 +0200 From: Pavel Machek To: David Safford Cc: Casey Schaufler , Andrew Morton , Mimi Zohar , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , Greg KH , Dmitry Kasatkin Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/21] EVM Message-ID: <20110526183849.GA4563@ucw.cz> References: <1305557115-15652-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20110518172552.6d482c7a.akpm@linux-foundation.org> <20110526060842.GA13933@localhost.ucw.cz> <4DDE80FE.7010005@schaufler-ca.com> <1306433514.24986.26.camel@localhost.localdomain> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1306433514.24986.26.camel@localhost.localdomain> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1820 Lines: 45 On Thu 2011-05-26 14:11:54, David Safford wrote: > On Thu, 2011-05-26 at 09:34 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: > > On 5/25/2011 11:08 PM, Pavel Machek wrote: > > > ... > > > Fourthly, is it likely to find its way to the next cellphone I buy, > > > and will it prevent me from rooting it? > > > > That will of course depend on the phone vendor. You are certainly > > going to be able to vote with your checkbook (digital wallet?) but > > odds are pretty good that should EVM prove effective it will be > > ubiquitous within the next five years on embedded devices. Hmm. But maybe it is more effective to vote with NAKs, now? It does not seem to have any non-evil uses. Phone vendors will play nasty tricks on us, but... why make it easy for them? > um, not quite the right threat model... > > Rooting is normally done through an exploit of the loader > or the kernel, neither of which EVM can prevent. The phones Androids are often rooted by exploiting kernel or userspace security holes. G1 was rooted by shell that was left running on console... > Whether or not the phone is rooted, IMA-Appraisal, EVM, and > the Digital Signature Extensions help protect against remote > software attacks, and offline hardware attacks on individual > files, but not against rooting itself. As far as I can tell, file signatures only prevent "offline hardware attacks"; that is user trying to "attack" (== root) his own computer. Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/