Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754538Ab1E0NiU (ORCPT ); Fri, 27 May 2011 09:38:20 -0400 Received: from mx3.mail.elte.hu ([157.181.1.138]:56610 "EHLO mx3.mail.elte.hu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751152Ab1E0NiS (ORCPT ); Fri, 27 May 2011 09:38:18 -0400 Date: Fri, 27 May 2011 15:38:04 +0200 From: Ingo Molnar To: Vivek Goyal Cc: Dan Rosenberg , Tony Luck , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, davej@redhat.com, kees.cook@canonical.com, davem@davemloft.net, eranian@google.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, adobriyan@gmail.com, penberg@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, Arjan van de Ven , Andrew Morton , Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu, pageexec@freemail.hu, Eric Paris Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] Randomize kernel base address on boot Message-ID: <20110527133804.GC23626@elte.hu> References: <1306269105.21443.20.camel@dan> <20110526203502.GK29496@redhat.com> <20110526204030.GL29496@redhat.com> <1306442674.2279.29.camel@dan> <20110526205549.GM29496@redhat.com> <20110527093853.GI21386@elte.hu> <20110527130731.GA8053@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20110527130731.GA8053@redhat.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-08-17) X-ELTE-SpamScore: -2.0 X-ELTE-SpamLevel: X-ELTE-SpamCheck: no X-ELTE-SpamVersion: ELTE 2.0 X-ELTE-SpamCheck-Details: score=-2.0 required=5.9 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=no SpamAssassin version=3.3.1 -2.0 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% [score: 0.0000] Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1435 Lines: 39 * Vivek Goyal wrote: > On Fri, May 27, 2011 at 11:38:53AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > > > * Vivek Goyal wrote: > > > > > > Is it common to run kexec-tools as non-root? It may be necessary > > > > to restrict this interface to root when randomization is used > > > > (keep in mind nobody's going to force you to turn this on by > > > > default, at least for the foreseeable future). > > > > > > kexec-tools runs as root. And I see that /proc/iomem permissions > > > are also for root only. So it probably is a non-issue. > > > > it might be an issue to keep in mind for later projects that try to > > lock down root itself from being able to patch the kernel (other than > > rebooting the box), using signed modules, disabled direct-ioport > > access, and other hardened facilities. > > For such environments, Eric Paris had posted a patch to be able to > disable loading of kexec/kdump kernel, similar to disabling module > loading. > > https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/1/19/412 > > I don't see that in Linus's tree. So looks like it never got > committed. That patch looks sane enough. Ping akpm about it please? Thanks, Ingo -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/