Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756379Ab1FCWQq (ORCPT ); Fri, 3 Jun 2011 18:16:46 -0400 Received: from mail-wy0-f174.google.com ([74.125.82.174]:34618 "EHLO mail-wy0-f174.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753444Ab1FCWQo (ORCPT ); Fri, 3 Jun 2011 18:16:44 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date :x-google-sender-auth:message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; b=IMPlaV412hypkz5pz7Gol9uPTZoxKLCKWSoZ3PjxJpJE5qAWn4Hu89feKPM0BOCDWk Gd5AE6dtjN6O70h2n8ztCo6ndZN+COzMgleLDqX+Br2N8ken3yLEUSsql+JJvx4gCJ93 ohHeVJwRcefIP39kC8c4PcBc61Uio2FuBz420= MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <1307133252-23259-3-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> References: <1307133252-23259-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <1307133252-23259-3-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2011 18:16:42 -0400 X-Google-Sender-Auth: uVtpJkMJfDgbbCBZHIdCO9tAWrs Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 03/13] seccomp_filters: new mode with configurable syscall filters From: Colin Walters To: Will Drewry Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kees.cook@canonical.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@elte.hu, rostedt@goodmis.org, jmorris@namei.org, paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Peter Zijlstra , Frederic Weisbecker , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 930 Lines: 19 On Fri, Jun 3, 2011 at 4:34 PM, Will Drewry wrote: > (Any thoughts specifically on the mutex use would be greatly appreciated!) > > This change adds a new seccomp mode which specifies the allowed system > calls dynamically. One thing to consider (not sure if it's been discussed, but I think not) is whether some of the LSMs should hook this. Notably, it looks like SELinux doesn't have an access vector for prctl at all now; it doesn't hook task_prctl from what I see, and so we fall back to cap_task_prctl. While I know the idea of restricting a process' ability to enter seccomp is a bit perverse, we should probably at least allow mandatory controls. James? -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/