Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756482Ab1FIDjI (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Jun 2011 23:39:08 -0400 Received: from mail-px0-f179.google.com ([209.85.212.179]:64914 "EHLO mail-px0-f179.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1756071Ab1FIDjF (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Jun 2011 23:39:05 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:from:date :x-google-sender-auth:message-id:subject:to:cc:content-type; b=cUqa+qxN1fDY0L6K/1UmJ0b0ncxbXsf4M02qwKMBH2pfWYup+VxsppWv/q4dzwjgqP 7nnjWQwAZqGUgIwLdbUu1w9a43TZ0Fo/C0Slx0896OLCkYCy1VrjrN15tzav3f9sVyhB BhdTOJxdx8gJR9cwvBlp+JXSivLMhvJwj9/Ok= MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <4DF037C6.4000507@linux.intel.com> References: <20110609004435.14550.qmail@science.horizon.com> <4DF037C6.4000507@linux.intel.com> From: Andrew Lutomirski Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2011 23:38:45 -0400 X-Google-Sender-Auth: vPXpg4Ef96gGbZ1a7MI7UURFqQg Message-ID: Subject: Re: Change in functionality of futex() system call. To: Darren Hart Cc: George Spelvin , david@rgmadvisors.com, kyle@moffetthome.net, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1280 Lines: 29 On Wed, Jun 8, 2011 at 11:02 PM, Darren Hart wrote: > On 06/08/2011 05:44 PM, George Spelvin wrote: >> I'm not sure if it's best, but the risk of RO waiters interfering could >> be solved by giving them a lower prioirty for wakeup and always waking >> RW-mapped waiters first. > > This strikes me as bending over backwards and jumping through hoops > inside the kernel to avoid having to do proper permissions management in > userspace. Huh? I still don't understand why userspace ought to need to deny read access to a file to prevent DoS. I think it's entirely reasonable for userspace to make the assumption that users with read access cannot make changes visible to writers unless explicitly documented (i.e. file locking, which is so thoroughly broken that it shouldn't be taken as an example of how to design anything). Given that current kernels make this use safe and the proposal is to make it unsafe, I think it's worth designing the interface to avoid introducing new security problems. --Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/