Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755019Ab1FKLl3 (ORCPT ); Sat, 11 Jun 2011 07:41:29 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:42736 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754569Ab1FKLl1 convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Sat, 11 Jun 2011 07:41:27 -0400 Date: Sat, 11 Jun 2011 07:41:13 -0400 From: Jeff Layton To: Connor Hansen Cc: Suresh Jayaraman , Martijn Uffing , linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, sean finney Subject: Re: [OOPS] 3.0-rc1 cifs Message-ID: <20110611074113.5a05f919@tlielax.poochiereds.net> In-Reply-To: References: <20110609183045.01f6f9fc@tlielax.poochiereds.net> <20110610073702.061bc014@corrin.poochiereds.net> <4DF20A97.8010405@suse.de> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 8010 Lines: 203 On Fri, 10 Jun 2011 05:49:46 -0700 Connor Hansen wrote: > On Fri, Jun 10, 2011 at 5:14 AM, Suresh Jayaraman wrote: > > On 06/10/2011 05:33 PM, Connor Hansen wrote: > >> On Fri, Jun 10, 2011 at 4:37 AM, Jeff Layton wrote: > >>> On Fri, 10 Jun 2011 02:57:21 +0200 (CEST) > >>>  Uffing wrote: > >>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> call in get_dfs_path() > >>>>> rc = CIFSTCon(xid, pSesInfo, temp_unc, NULL, nls_codepage); > >>>>> > >>>>> function header for CIFSTCon > >>>>> int  CIFSTCon(unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, > >>>>>          const char *tree, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, > >>>>>          const struct nls_table *nls_codepage) > >>>>> > >>>>> get_dfs_path() is passing struct cifs_tcon *tcon as NULL > >>>>> > >>>>> from config:  CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH=y > >>>>> > >>>>> in CIFSTCon > >>>>> > >>>>> #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH > >>>>> 3222                 if ((global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN) && > >>>>> 3223                     (ses->server->secType == LANMAN)) > >>>>> 3224                         calc_lanman_hash(tcon->password, > >>>>> ses->server->cryptkey, > >>>>> > >>>>> in calc_lanman_hash tcon is dereferenced(tcon->password) without being > >>>>> checked if null > >>>>> > >>>>> 3225                                          ses->server->sec_mode & > >>>>> 3226                                             SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT ? > >>>>> true : false, > >>>>> 3227                                          bcc_ptr); > >>>>> 3228                 else > >>>>> 3229 #endif /* CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */ > >>>>> > >>>>> Connor > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Ave all > >>>> > >>>> I recompiled  kernel 3.0-rc1 (hadn't enabled CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y) and put > >>>> the oops (with the new adresses) through gdb per instruction of Jeff. And > >>>> Connor was spot on! > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a0 > >>>> IP: [] CIFSTCon+0xf6/0x4d0 [cifs] > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> This GDB was configured as "x86_64-linux-gnu". > >>>> For bug reporting instructions, please see: > >>>> ... > >>>> Reading symbols from > >>>> /lib/modules/3.0.0-rc1-debug/kernel/fs/cifs/cifs.ko...done. > >>>> (gdb) list *(CIFSTCon+0xf6) > >>>> 0xc2b6 is in CIFSTCon (fs/cifs/connect.c:3230). > >>>> 3225                                             ses->server->sec_mode & > >>>> 3226                                                SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT ? > >>>> true : false, > >>>> 3227                                             bcc_ptr); > >>>> 3228                    else > >>>> 3229    #endif /* CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */ > >>>> 3230                    rc = SMBNTencrypt(tcon->password, > >>>> ses->server->cryptkey, > >>>> 3231                                            bcc_ptr); > >>>> 3232 > >>>> 3233                    bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE; > >>>> 3234                    if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) { > >>>> (gdb) > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> (cc'ing Sean F. since I suspect this regression is due to his changes) > >>> > >>> Thanks for the analysis, Martijn and Connor... > >>> > >>> What sort of server are you mounting here? It looks like it's using > >>> share-level security, so it's either very old or is a samba server > >>> configured that way. > >>> > >>> I suspect that commit c1508ca236 is the culprit. With that, we call > >>> into expand_dfs_referral on every mount attempt. Previously we only > >>> called into there when we got back  an EREMOTE error and that would > >>> have been unlikely on a share-level security connection. > >>> > >>> I think there are several possible solutions, but since Sean was in > >>> here most recently I'd like to have his opinion. > >> > >> I don't know enough about cifs but this call in fs/cifs/connect.c > >> > >> 2268: rc = CIFSTCon(xid, pSesInfo, temp_unc, NULL, nls_codepage); > >> > >> will always result in a null pointer derefence as CIFSTCon uses the > >> cifs_tcon struct for passwords without verification > > > > Yes, I too was hovering around this code path today and it doesn't look > > correct. Specifically, the call from cifs_dfs_path to CIFSTCon with > > cifs_tcon as NULL seems wrong. I tried to do dig history a bit with `git > > blame`, but couldn't figure out the commit that introduced this. > > > > > > -- > > Suresh Jayaraman > > > > git annotate fs/cifs/connect.c > 1da177e4 (Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 2268) > rc = CIFSTCon(xid, pSesInfo, temp_unc, NULL, nls_codepage); > > this was valid at the time to simply get the rc, and the code was checked > if ((rc == 0) && (tcon != NULL)) { // first use of tcon in > CIFSTCon back then..... > > > after a loooooong look, i found the patch which changed it > > 00e485b0 > commit 00e485b0198ea4f509341373f1d9adb0a5977a2f > Author: Jeff Layton > Date: Fri Dec 5 20:41:21 2008 -0500 > > cifs: store password in tcon > > cifs: store password in tcon > > Each tcon has its own password for share-level security. Store it in > the tcon and wipe it clean and free it when freeing the tcon. When > doing the tree connect with share-level security, use the tcon password > instead of the session password. > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton > Signed-off-by: Steve French > Yep, mea culpa. This patch should fix it. Martin, can you test it? Anyone else have comments? Thanks... -----------------------[snip]-------------------- [PATCH] cifs: correctly handle NULL tcon pointer in CIFSTCon Long ago (in commit 00e485b0), I added some code to handle share-level passwords in CIFSTCon. That code ignored the fact that it's legit to pass in a NULL tcon pointer when connecting to the IPC$ share on the server. This wasn't really a problem until recently as we only called CIFSTCon this way when the server returned -EREMOTE. With the introduction of commit c1508ca2 however, it gets called this way on every mount, causing an oops when share-level security is in effect. Fix this by simply treating a NULL tcon pointer as if user-level security were in effect. I'm not aware of any servers that protect the IPC$ share with a specific password anyway. Also, add a comment to the top of CIFSTCon to ensure that we don't make the same mistake again. Reported-by: Martijn Uffing Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 6 +++++- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 7b6cad2..fa5a5d7 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -3174,6 +3174,10 @@ out: return rc; } +/* + * Issue a TREE_CONNECT request. Note that for IPC$ shares, that the tcon + * pointer may be NULL. + */ int CIFSTCon(unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, const char *tree, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, @@ -3208,7 +3212,7 @@ CIFSTCon(unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, pSMB->AndXCommand = 0xFF; pSMB->Flags = cpu_to_le16(TCON_EXTENDED_SECINFO); bcc_ptr = &pSMB->Password[0]; - if ((ses->server->sec_mode) & SECMODE_USER) { + if (!tcon || (ses->server->sec_mode & SECMODE_USER)) { pSMB->PasswordLength = cpu_to_le16(1); /* minimum */ *bcc_ptr = 0; /* password is null byte */ bcc_ptr++; /* skip password */ -- 1.7.5.2 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/