Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756087Ab1FTWpp (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Jun 2011 18:45:45 -0400 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:55602 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755099Ab1FTWpn (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Jun 2011 18:45:43 -0400 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Bryan Donlan Cc: Greg Kurz , akpm@linux-foundation.org, containers@lists.osdl.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, serge@hallyn.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr, oleg@redhat.com, xemul@openvz.org, Cedric Le Goater References: <20110615145527.4016.70157.stgit@bahia.local> <1308570316.8230.140.camel@bahia.local> Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2011 15:44:57 -0700 In-Reply-To: (Bryan Donlan's message of "Mon, 20 Jun 2011 13:37:24 -0400") Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/23.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-XM-SPF: eid=;;;mid=;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=98.207.153.68;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1+wTnmaBFMRV3oryeGlRaZhV0viLuSB6tU= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG * -3.0 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% * [score: 0.0000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 T_XMDrugObfuBody_08 obfuscated drug references * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_03 6+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_02 5+ unique symbols in subject * 0.4 UNTRUSTED_Relay Comes from a non-trusted relay X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Bryan Donlan X-Spam-Relay-Country: Subject: Re: [PATCH] Introduce ActivePid: in /proc/self/status (v2, was Vpid:) X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Fri, 06 Aug 2010 16:31:04 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1941 Lines: 50 Bryan Donlan writes: > On Mon, Jun 20, 2011 at 07:45, Greg Kurz wrote: >> On Thu, 2011-06-16 at 13:54 -0400, Bryan Donlan wrote: > >>> Although getting the in-namespace PID is a useful thing, wouldn't a >>> truly race-free API be preferable? Any access by PID has the race >>> condition in which the target process could die, and its PID get >>> recycled between retrieving the PID and doing something with it. >> >> Well the PID is a racy construct when used by another task than the >> parent... fortunately, most userland code can cope with it ! :) > > That doesn't mean we shouldn't try to fix the race! :) > >>> Perhaps a file-descriptor API would be better, such as something like >>> this: >>> >>> int openpid(int id, int flags); >>> int rt_sigqueueinfo_fd(int process_fd, int sig, siginfo_t *info); >>> int sigqueue_fd(int process_fd, int sig, const union sigval value); // >>> glibc wrapper >>> >> >> The race still exists: openpid() is being passed a PID... Only the >> parent can legitimately know that this PID identifies a specific >> unwaited child. > > Yes, the idea would be either the parent process, or the target > process itself would open the PID, then pass the resulting file > descriptor to whatever process is actually doing the killing. > Alternately, one could add additional calls to help identify whether > the right process was opened (perhaps a call to get a directory handle > to the corresponding /proc directory?) fd = open("/proc/self/", O_DIRECTORY); ? Doing something based on proc files seems like a reasonable direction to head if we are working on a race free api. I suspect all we need is a sigqueue file. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/