Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753505Ab1F2BpG (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Jun 2011 21:45:06 -0400 Received: from adelie.canonical.com ([91.189.90.139]:39458 "EHLO adelie.canonical.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751894Ab1F2Bol (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Jun 2011 21:44:41 -0400 From: John Johansen To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 2/2] AppArmor: Fix masking of capabilities in complain mode Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2011 02:44:34 +0100 Message-Id: <1309311874-23262-3-git-send-email-john.johansen@canonical.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.4.1 In-Reply-To: <1309311874-23262-1-git-send-email-john.johansen@canonical.com> References: <1309311874-23262-1-git-send-email-john.johansen@canonical.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1596 Lines: 40 AppArmor is masking the capabilities returned by capget against the capabilities mask in the profile. This is wrong, in complain mode the profile has effectively all capabilities, as the profile restrictions are not being enforced, merely tested against to determine if an access is known by the profile. This can result in the wrong behavior of security conscience applications like sshd which examine their capability set, and change their behavior accordingly. In this case because of the masked capability set being returned sshd fails due to DAC checks, even when the profile is in complain mode. Kernels affected: 2.6.36 - 3.0. Signed-off-by: John Johansen --- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 3d2fd14..3783202 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; *permitted = cred->cap_permitted; - if (!unconfined(profile)) { + if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow); *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow); } -- 1.7.4.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/