Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752373Ab1F3VGo (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Jun 2011 17:06:44 -0400 Received: from mga02.intel.com ([134.134.136.20]:23928 "EHLO mga02.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751312Ab1F3VGm (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Jun 2011 17:06:42 -0400 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.65,454,1304319600"; d="scan'208";a="20287285" User-Agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.12.0.110505 Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2011 14:06:39 -0700 Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 00/16] EVM From: Ryan Ware To: Mimi Zohar , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" CC: , , James Morris , David Safford , Andrew Morton , Greg KH , Dmitry Kasatkin Message-ID: Thread-Topic: [PATCH v7 00/16] EVM In-Reply-To: <1309377038-4550-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Mime-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 818 Lines: 22 Glad to see this going in Mimi! Looking forward to enabling this in our MeeGo kernels. Ryan On 6/29/11 12:50 PM, "Mimi Zohar" wrote: >Discretionary Access Control(DAC) and Mandatory Access Control(MAC) can >protect the integrity of a running system from unauthorized changes. When >these protections are not running, such as when booting a malicious OS, >mounting the disk under a different operating system, or physically moving >the disk to another system, an "offline" attack is free to read and write >file data/metadata. > >...snip... -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/