Message-ID: <4F311BBD.5050600@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 07 Feb 2012 14:40:29 +0200
From: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
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To: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
CC: Scott Wood <scottwood@freescale.com>, qemu-devel <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>, KVM list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC] Next gen kvm api
References: <4F2AB552.2070909@redhat.com>	<CAG7+5M0s_F93G3dPrRQaFMVv_hPzpd-wYEPApJUDGhh3vJuy-A@mail.gmail.com>	<4F2C6517.3040203@codemonkey.ws> <4F302E0D.20302@freescale.com> <4F3118EA.7040302@codemonkey.ws>
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On 02/07/2012 02:28 PM, Anthony Liguori wrote:
>
>>  It's a potential source of exploits
>> (from bugs in KVM or in hardware).  I can see people wanting to be
>> selective with access because of that.
>
> As is true of the rest of the kernel.
>
> If you want finer grain access control, that's exactly why we have 
> things like LSM and SELinux.  You can add the appropriate LSM hooks 
> into the KVM infrastructure and setup default SELinux policies 
> appropriately.

LSMs protect objects, not syscalls.  There isn't an object to protect 
here (except the fake /dev/kvm object).

In theory, kvm is exactly the same as other syscalls, but in practice, 
it is used by only very few user programs, so there may be many 
unexercised paths.

-- 
I have a truly marvellous patch that fixes the bug which this
signature is too narrow to contain.

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