Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754571Ab2B0SWI (ORCPT ); Mon, 27 Feb 2012 13:22:08 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:61797 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754475Ab2B0SWG (ORCPT ); Mon, 27 Feb 2012 13:22:06 -0500 Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2012 19:14:34 +0100 From: Oleg Nesterov To: Kees Cook Cc: Will Drewry , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net, hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net, mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu, eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 07/12] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Message-ID: <20120227181434.GA13903@redhat.com> References: <1330140111-17201-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <1330140111-17201-7-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <20120227171132.GB10608@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.18 (2008-05-17) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1421 Lines: 40 On 02/27, Kees Cook wrote: > > On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 9:11 AM, Oleg Nesterov wrote: > > On 02/24, Will Drewry wrote: > >> > >> ?static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall) > >> ?{ > >> ? ? ? struct seccomp_filter *f; > >> - ? ? u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL; > >> ? ? ? static const struct bpf_load_fn fns = { > >> ? ? ? ? ? ? ? bpf_load, > >> ? ? ? ? ? ? ? sizeof(struct seccomp_data), > >> ? ? ? }; > >> + ? ? u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW; > >> ? ? ? const void *sc_ptr = (const void *)(uintptr_t)syscall; > >> > >> + ? ? /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */ > >> + ? ? if (unlikely(current->seccomp.filter == NULL)) > >> + ? ? ? ? ? ? ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL; > > > > Is "seccomp.filter == NULL" really possible? > > It should not be, but I'm much more comfortable with this failing > closed. I think it's important to be as defensive as possible with > this code given its intended use. Can't resists... Sorry, I know I am troll but personally I think in this case the most defensive code is BUG_ON(->filter == NULL) or at least WARN_ON(). Nevermind, I won't pretend I really understand the intended use, please ignore. Oleg. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/