Message-ID: <1330370733.2542.18.camel@localhost>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 06/12] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>,
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Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2012 14:25:33 -0500
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On Mon, 2012-02-27 at 10:55 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 8:49 AM, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> wrote:

> You mean as used in audit_log_exit() ? It looks like that depends on a
> lot of state cached in __audit_syscall_entry() and finally triggered
> in __audit_syscall_exit() (and ..._free()). I don't think this is
> really want seccomp wants to be involved in.
> 
> By CONFIG_AUDITSC, you mean CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL? Without that set,
> audit_seccomp is a no-op.
> 
> The reason compat needs to be reported (or rather, arch) is because
> just reporting syscall is ambiguous. It either needs arch or compat to
> distinguish it.

Yes, that is what I mean and you are right.  You shouldn't push the
syscall in this record either.  If !audit_dummy_context() you are
already going to get arch, syscall, and a0-a4 in the associated audit
record.  Please do not duplicate that info.

It might make sense to have a separate audit_seccomp() path when
audit_dummy_context() which includes arch, syscall, and a0-a4.

It is my fault (85e7bac3) that we have syscall at all, but I'm on a new
crusade to remove audit record duplication.  So I'd happily see a patch
in this series that removes that instead of adds to it.

-Eric

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