Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754489Ab2FEQrM (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Jun 2012 12:47:12 -0400 Received: from mail-we0-f174.google.com ([74.125.82.174]:45133 "EHLO mail-we0-f174.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752160Ab2FEQrK (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Jun 2012 12:47:10 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20120605110541.GC13495@aftab.osrc.amd.com> References: <20120531153512.GK14515@aftab.osrc.amd.com> <20120531154224.GL14515@aftab.osrc.amd.com> <20120601110647.2c446aa7@rockpopper> <20120605110541.GC13495@aftab.osrc.amd.com> From: Linus Torvalds Date: Tue, 5 Jun 2012 09:46:49 -0700 X-Google-Sender-Auth: U-iKGh_rHIZWwemn1TGnQA1TMpc Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH] CMA: Do no enable it by default To: Borislav Petkov Cc: Christopher Yeoh , Andrew Morton , LKML , Randy Dunlap Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1057 Lines: 25 On Tue, Jun 5, 2012 at 4:05 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: > > Besides, in the config option it says "... which allow a process with > the correct privileges to directly read from or write to to another > process's address space.", which, if the reading process has somehow > gained privileges (as that never happens) is your security issue right > there. What? It's using the same privileges as ptrace. If you are allowed to ptrace somebody, there's no security issue. Also, the reason it's "default y" is that the feature actually made it in earlier (with no config option at all). Now, I certainly agree that we could turn it off by default since it's not that common, but at the same time none of your actual commit comments make sense, so that would have to be fixed first. Linus -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/