Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753788Ab2FLQy0 (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Jun 2012 12:54:26 -0400 Received: from mail-pz0-f46.google.com ([209.85.210.46]:45676 "EHLO mail-pz0-f46.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753643Ab2FLQyX (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Jun 2012 12:54:23 -0400 Message-ID: <4FD77438.6090202@redhat.com> Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2012 18:54:16 +0200 From: Paolo Bonzini User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:13.0) Gecko/20120605 Thunderbird/13.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 CC: James Bottomley , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] scsi: allow persistent reservations without CAP_SYS_RAWIO References: <1339517312-18134-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com> <1339518069.3050.8.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <4FD76D57.5020709@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <4FD76D57.5020709@redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1602 Lines: 34 Il 12/06/2012 18:24, Paolo Bonzini ha scritto: > Il 12/06/2012 18:21, James Bottomley ha scritto: >>>> Persistent reservations commands cannot be issued right now without >>>> giving CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the process who wishes to send them. This >>>> is a bit heavy-handed, allow these two commands. >> >> Why is this heavy handed? If you remove CAP_SYS_RAWIO, any userspace >> process can send these, which would allow any user to completely disrupt >> a SAN by injecting spurious reservations ... that doesn't look to be >> terribly safe for an operating system running in a data centre. > > It is heavy-handed because: > > 1) there are still other protections such as DAC (both Unix permissions > and ACLs) and SELinux; CAP_SYS_RAWIO is effectively the same as root. > > 2) if any user could disrupt the SAN by injecting spurious reservations > just by having his laptop's root password, that data centre wouldn't be > terribly safe to begin with. 3) assume that with this patch user X could disrupt the SAN by injecting spurious reservations, e.g. forbidding another user from writing some data. Then they could also destroy those same data even without this patch, which is just as disrupting. This is because you still need write permission to the device to issue reservations. Read permission will only let you use PERSISTENT RESREVE IN. Paolo -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/