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From: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.name>
To: Marco Colombo <marco@esi.it>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] (0/4) Entropy accounting fixes
Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2002 18:29:52 +0200
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> Not at all. Let me (one process) read 1MB from /dev/urandom,
> and analyze it. If I can break SHA-1, I'm able to predict *future*
> /dev/urandom output, expecially if I keep draining bits from
> /dev/random.

True, but you cannot predict which task will read which part
of the output of urandom.
Also not all attackers can read from urandom.

If you really care, you might implement entropy pools
per user.

	Regards
		Oliver

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