Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754786Ab2HMWEt (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Aug 2012 18:04:49 -0400 Received: from mail-yw0-f46.google.com ([209.85.213.46]:56083 "EHLO mail-yw0-f46.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754722Ab2HMWEi (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Aug 2012 18:04:38 -0400 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg KH , torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, "Theodore Tso" , "H. Peter Anvin" Subject: [ 17/44] random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2012 15:02:24 -0700 Message-Id: <20120813220143.656808815@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.10.1.362.g242cab3 In-Reply-To: <20120813220142.113186818@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20120813220142.113186818@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.60-20.5 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1658 Lines: 54 From: Greg KH 3.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Theodore Ts'o commit 3e88bdff1c65145f7ba297ccec69c774afe4c785 upstream. If there is an architecture-specific random number generator (such as RDRAND for Intel architectures), use it to initialize /dev/random's entropy stores. Even in the worst case, if RDRAND is something like AES(NSA_KEY, counter++), it won't hurt, and it will definitely help against any other adversaries. Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -965,6 +965,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); */ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) { + int i; ktime_t now; unsigned long flags; @@ -974,6 +975,11 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy now = ktime_get_real(); mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now)); + for (i = r->poolinfo->poolwords; i; i--) { + if (!arch_get_random_long(&flags)) + break; + mix_pool_bytes(r, &flags, sizeof(flags)); + } mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); } -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/