Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756837Ab2JEQq6 (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Oct 2012 12:46:58 -0400 Received: from e32.co.us.ibm.com ([32.97.110.150]:41884 "EHLO e32.co.us.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752256Ab2JEQq4 (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Oct 2012 12:46:56 -0400 Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 09:46:42 -0700 From: "Paul E. McKenney" To: Matthew Garrett Cc: Kees Cook , Greg Kroah-Hartman , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Eric W. Biederman" , Serge Hallyn , "David S. Miller" , Andrew Morton , Frederic Weisbecker Subject: Re: [PATCH] make CONFIG_EXPERIMENTAL invisible and default Message-ID: <20121005164642.GA10711@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reply-To: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com References: <20121002195042.GA16087@www.outflux.net> <20121003132538.GE13192@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20121003161702.GA22008@kroah.com> <20121003164712.GF2527@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20121003200314.GR2527@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20121004015539.GA19958@srcf.ucam.org> <20121004143150.GA2464@linux.vnet.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20121004143150.GA2464@linux.vnet.ibm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Content-Scanned: Fidelis XPS MAILER x-cbid: 12100516-5406-0000-0000-000000D9A464 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3555 Lines: 93 On Thu, Oct 04, 2012 at 07:31:50AM -0700, Paul E. McKenney wrote: > On Thu, Oct 04, 2012 at 02:55:39AM +0100, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > On Wed, Oct 03, 2012 at 01:03:14PM -0700, Paul E. McKenney wrote: > > > > > That has not proven sufficient for me in the past, RCU_FAST_NO_HZ > > > being a case in point. > > > > Taint the kernel at boot time? That'd be sufficient to force distros to > > disable it. > > Cool! That does sound much more socially responsible than my thought > of forcing a splat (e.g., WARN_ON(1)) during boot. ;-) So, from what I can see, here is the list of the ways of warning distros off of a given kernel config option, taken in terms of CONFIG_RCU_USER_QS: 1. Make CONFIG_RCU_USER_QS depend on CONFIG_BROKEN. It sounds to me like distros would avoid adding this (do they?), but tester would probably avoid it as well. 2. Make CONFIG_RCU_USER_QS depend on CONFIG_STAGING. As Frederic noted, this is more of a driver thing than a core-kernel thing, so probably not appropriate. 3. Boot-time WARN_ON() if CONFIG_RCU_USER_QS=y. This seems to me to be a tad excessive. But the place to do it might be rcu_bootup_announce_oddness() in kernel/rcutree_plugin.h. 4. Remove CONFIG_RCU_USER_QS from Kconfig, so that users have to patch their kernel to enable it. This also seems a tad excessive. 5. Maintain CONFIG_RCU_USER_QS out of tree, for example in the -rt patchset. This is a good place to start, but it has been where CONFIG_RCU_USER_QS has been for some time, and although it got some good testing, it clearly needs more. In my view, CONFIG_RCU_USER_QS has outgrown its out-of-tree roots. 6. Boot-time add_taint() if CONFIG_RCU_USER_QS=y, as suggested by Matthew Garrett. The taint value might be TAINT_CRAP, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_WARN, or TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND -- all the other taint values disable lockdep. Of these four, TAINT_OOT_MODULE and TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND are clearly off-topic, leaving TAINT_CRAP and TAINT_WARN. Taking them one at a time: TAINT_CRAP: Used when loading modules from staging. TAINT_WARN: Used when "scheduling while atomic" is encountered. So I have my tongue only halfway in my cheek when I suggest starting with TAINT_CRAP, then moving to TAINT_WARN, then removing the tainting altogether. The place to do this might be rcu_bootup_announce_oddness() in kernel/rcutree_plugin.h. So how about the following progression? A. Early days, only a few crazies should test. In this case, the code should be out of tree, perhaps in something like -rt, perhaps as a set of patches. B. Need more testers, but still not expected to work reasonably. Mainline, but depending on CONFIG_BROKEN. (I am not all that enthusiastic about this option, but am including it for completeness.) C. Need wide testing, but don't want 100,000,000 unsuspecting test subjects. Taint the kernel with TAINT_CRAP. D. OK for production in special situations, but definitely not for typical users. Taint the kernel with TAINT_WARN. E. Ready for general production use. Mainlined without restrictions. I would say that CONFIG_RCU_USER_QS is currently at point C above, it clearly now needs testing on a wide variety of hardware, but also is clearly not ready for 100,000,000 users. Thoughts? Thanx, Paul -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/