Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755453Ab2JHWlE (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Oct 2012 18:41:04 -0400 Received: from mail-la0-f46.google.com ([209.85.215.46]:35809 "EHLO mail-la0-f46.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752306Ab2JHWk7 (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Oct 2012 18:40:59 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <20121004015539.GA19958@srcf.ucam.org> <20121004143150.GA2464@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20121005164642.GA10711@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20121007014447.GB2485@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20121007163029.GG2485@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20121007201854.GA6628@redhat.com> <20121008010410.GL2485@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20121008222939.GK2453@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 8 Oct 2012 15:40:57 -0700 X-Google-Sender-Auth: h3piuapG54ld1EN6AwRNdcFnVq8 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH] make CONFIG_EXPERIMENTAL invisible and default From: Kees Cook To: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: Dave Jones , Dave Airlie , Frederic Weisbecker , Matthew Garrett , Greg Kroah-Hartman , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Eric W. Biederman" , Serge Hallyn , "David S. Miller" , Andrew Morton Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 X-System-Of-Record: true Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3517 Lines: 71 On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 3:37 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 3:29 PM, Paul E. McKenney > wrote: >> On Mon, Oct 08, 2012 at 03:07:24PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: >>> On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 6:04 PM, Paul E. McKenney >>> wrote: >>> > On Sun, Oct 07, 2012 at 04:18:54PM -0400, Dave Jones wrote: >>> >> On Sun, Oct 07, 2012 at 09:30:29AM -0700, Paul E. McKenney wrote: >>> >> >>> >> > > I think Kconfig is mostly what distro would like to use the thing is >>> >> > > the Kconfig text needs to be there upfront when its merged, not two >>> >> > > months later, since then it too late for a distro to notice. >>> >> > > >>> >> > > I'd bet most distros would read the warnings, but in a lot of cases >>> >> > > the warning don't exist until its too late. >>> >> > >>> >> > In the case of CONFIG_RCU_USER_QS you are quite right, the warning >>> >> > should have been there from the beginning and was not. I suppose you >>> >> > could argue that the warning was not sufficiently harsh in the case of >>> >> > CONFIG_RCU_FAST_NO_HZ, but either way it did get ignored: >>> >> >>> >> Maybe if we had a universally agreed upon tag for kconfig, like >>> >> "distro recommendation: N" that would make things obvious, and also allow >>> >> those of us unfortunate enough to maintain distro kernels to have something >>> >> to easily grep for. This would also catch the case when you eventually (hopefully) >>> >> flip from an N to a Y. >>> >> >>> >> There will likely still be some distros that will decide they know better >>> >> (and I'm pretty sure eventually I'll find reason to do so myself), but it at least >>> >> gives the feature maintainer the "I told you so" clause. >>> >> >>> >> Something we do quite often for our in-development kernels is enable something >>> >> that's shiny, new and unproven, and then when we branch for a release, we turn >>> >> it back off. It would be great if a lot of this kind of thing could be more automated. >>> > >>> > One approach would be to have CONFIG_DISTRO, so that experimental >>> > features could use "depends on !DISTRO", but also to have multiple >>> > "BLEEDING" symbols. For example, given a CONFIG_DISTRO_BLEEDING_HPC >>> > and CONFIG_DISTRO_BLEEDING_RT, CONFIG_RCU_USER_QS might eventually >>> > use the following clause: >>> > >>> > depends on !DISTRO || DISTRO_BLEEDING_HPC || DISTRO_BLEEDING_RT >>> > >>> > A normal distro would define DISTRO, a distro looking to provide bleeding-edge >>> > HPC or real-time features would also define DISTRO_BLEEDING_HPC or >>> > DISTRO_BLEEDING_RT, respectively. >>> > >>> > Does that make sense, or am I being overly naive? >>> >>> I think we should avoid any global configs that disable things. We'll >>> just end up in the same place with distros again. >> >> So you believe that we should taint the kernel or splat on boot to >> warn distros off of features that might not be ready for 100 million >> users? Or do you have some other approach in mind? > > Personally, I think taint+printk seems like the right way to go. Actually, I think printk is sufficient. I don't want kernel taint to become the new CONFIG_EXPERIMENTAL. :) -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/