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Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2012 15:09:11 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
To: Shea Levy <shea@shealevy.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
Message-ID: <20121031150911.GA12799@srcf.ucam.org>
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On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 11:05:08AM -0400, Shea Levy wrote:
> Or the boot variable where you stored the key, but in that case I'd
> say the attacker has won too.

Right, in that case they can compromise MOK.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org
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