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Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2012 17:45:20 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
To: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>, Josh Boyer <jwboyer@gmail.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
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Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
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On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 05:49:19PM +0000, Alan Cox wrote:
> On Wed, 31 Oct 2012 17:37:50 +0000
> Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> wrote:
> > What S4 resume check?
> 
> One you would add .. but no I'm wrong there - its a problem at the
> suspend point so you do need a signature for it. Oh well yet another
> reason it's nto useful.

Right. Hence the idea of a protected keystore at boot time. We can do 
this securely, but it does involve writing code.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org
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