Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754831Ab2KAJUQ (ORCPT ); Thu, 1 Nov 2012 05:20:16 -0400 Received: from cantor2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:58617 "EHLO mx2.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752361Ab2KAJUN (ORCPT ); Thu, 1 Nov 2012 05:20:13 -0400 Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 10:20:08 +0100 (CET) From: Jiri Kosina To: James Bottomley Cc: Oliver Neukum , Chris Friesen , Alan Cox , Matthew Garrett , Josh Boyer , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support In-Reply-To: <1351760905.2391.19.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> Message-ID: References: <1348152065-31353-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com> <2548314.3caaFsMVg6@linux-lqwf.site> <50919EED.3020601@genband.com> <36538307.gzWq1oO7Kg@linux-lqwf.site> <1351760905.2391.19.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> User-Agent: Alpine 2.00 (LNX 1167 2008-08-23) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1243 Lines: 31 On Thu, 1 Nov 2012, James Bottomley wrote: > The point I'm making is that given that the majority of exploits will > already be able to execute arbitrary code in-kernel, there's not much > point trying to consider features like this as attacker prevention. We > should really be focusing on discussing why we'd want to prevent a > legitimate local root from writing to the suspend partition in a secure > boot environment. Well, this is being repeated over and over again when talking about secure boot, right? My understanding is that we are not trying to protect against root exploiting the kernel. We are trying to protect against root tampering with the kernel code and data through legitimate use of kernel-provided facilitiies (/dev/mem, ioperm, reprogramming devices to DMA to arbitrary memory locations, resuming from hibernation image that has been tampered with, etc). Or perhaps I just misunderstood the point you were trying to make? Thanks, -- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/