Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1761739Ab2KAOlo (ORCPT ); Thu, 1 Nov 2012 10:41:44 -0400 Received: from lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk ([81.2.110.251]:34725 "EHLO lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1761539Ab2KAOll (ORCPT ); Thu, 1 Nov 2012 10:41:41 -0400 Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 14:46:35 +0000 From: Alan Cox To: Eric Paris Cc: James Bottomley , Jiri Kosina , Oliver Neukum , Chris Friesen , Matthew Garrett , Josh Boyer , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support Message-ID: <20121101144635.55687287@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> In-Reply-To: References: <1348152065-31353-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com> <2548314.3caaFsMVg6@linux-lqwf.site> <50919EED.3020601@genband.com> <36538307.gzWq1oO7Kg@linux-lqwf.site> <1351760905.2391.19.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <1351762703.2391.31.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <1351763954.2391.37.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.8.1 (GTK+ 2.24.8; x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) Face: 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 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1724 Lines: 39 > Imagine you run windows and you've never heard of Linux. To those people I think you mean "never heard of Ubuntu" ;-) > In this case we have a completely 'untrusted' root inside Linux. From > the user PoV root and Linux are both malware. Notice the EXACT same > attack would work launching rootkit'd Linux from Linux. So don't > pretend not to care about Windows. It's just that launching malware > Linux seems like a reason to get your key revoked. We don't want > signed code which can be used as an attack vector on ourselves or on > others. > > That make sense? Not really but it keeps some of the Red Hat security people happy and out of harms way. With all the current posted RH patches I can still take over the box as root trivially enough and you seem to have so far abolished suspend to disk, kexec and a pile of other useful stuff. To actually lock it down you'll have to do a ton more of this. I suspect folks who know windows innards well are probably thinking the same about Windows 8 8) Almost anyone attacking a secure boot box will do it via windows or more likely via EFI. EFI because its large, new and doesn't a great history, windows because its the larger target. Actually from what I've seen on the security front there seems to a distinct view that secure boot is irrelevant because Windows 8 is so suspend/resume focussed that you might as well just trojan the box until the next reboot as its likely to be a couple of weeks a way. Alan -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/