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Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 14:57:31 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
To: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Khalid Aziz <khalid@gonehiking.org>, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
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        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: Kdump with signed images
Message-ID: <20121101145731.GB10662@srcf.ucam.org>
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On Thu, Nov 01, 2012 at 10:51:49AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:

> And if one wants only /sbin/kexec to call it, then just sign that
> one so no other executable will be able to call kexec_load(). Though
> I don't think that's the requirement here. Requirement is that only
> trusted executables should be able to call kexec_load().

Where "trusted executables" means "signed by a key that's present in the 
system firmware or in the kernel that's signed with a key that's present 
in the system firmware", sure.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org
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