Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1761967Ab2KAPRS (ORCPT ); Thu, 1 Nov 2012 11:17:18 -0400 Received: from mail-ea0-f174.google.com ([209.85.215.174]:58450 "EHLO mail-ea0-f174.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1761915Ab2KAPRP (ORCPT ); Thu, 1 Nov 2012 11:17:15 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <1351782390.2391.69.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> References: <2548314.3caaFsMVg6@linux-lqwf.site> <50919EED.3020601@genband.com> <36538307.gzWq1oO7Kg@linux-lqwf.site> <1351760905.2391.19.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <1351762703.2391.31.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <1351763954.2391.37.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <1351780935.2391.58.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <20121101144912.GA10269@srcf.ucam.org> <1351782390.2391.69.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 11:17:14 -0400 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support From: Eric Paris To: James Bottomley Cc: Matthew Garrett , Jiri Kosina , Oliver Neukum , Chris Friesen , Alan Cox , Josh Boyer , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1029 Lines: 24 On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 11:06 AM, James Bottomley wrote: > But surely that's fanciful ... you've already compromised windows to get > access to the ESP. If you've done it once, you can do it again until > the exploit is patched. You work under the assumption that any bad operation was done by means of a compromised kernel. Admins install things all the time, sometimes, things which they shouldn't. (This statement is OS agnostic) > There are likely many easier ways of ensuring > persistence than trying to install a full linux kernel with a > compromised resume system. I'm sure lots of us would love to hear the ideas. And the attack is on the suspend side, nothing about resume has to be malicious (not really relevant I guess)... -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/