SELinux stores the configuration state and the policy capabilities
in kernel memory. Changes to this data at runtime would have an impact
on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring this data
through IMA subsystem provides a tamper-resistant way for
an attestation service to remotely validate it at runtime.
Measure the configuration state and policy capabilities by calling
the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data().
To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data
2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux
Sample measurement of SELinux state and policy capabilities:
10 2122...65d8 ima-buf sha256:13c2...1292 selinux-state 696e...303b
Execute the following command to extract the measured data
from the IMA's runtime measurements list:
grep "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p
The output should be a list of key-value pairs. For example,
initialized=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;
To verify the measurement is consistent with the current SELinux state
reported on the system, compare the integer values in the following
files with those set in the IMA measurement (using the following commands):
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/enforce
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities/[capability_file]
Note that the actual verification would be against an expected state
and done on a separate system (likely an attestation server) requiring
"initialized=1;enforcing=1;checkreqprot=0;"
for a secure state and then whatever policy capabilities are actually
set in the expected policy (which can be extracted from the policy
itself via seinfo, for example).
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/ima.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/include/ima.h | 6 +++
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 6 +++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ima.c b/security/selinux/ima.c
index 03715893ff97..5c7f73cd1117 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ima.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ima.c
@@ -13,18 +13,73 @@
#include "ima.h"
/*
- * selinux_ima_measure_state - Measure hash of the SELinux policy
+ * selinux_ima_collect_state - Read selinux configuration settings
*
- * @state: selinux state struct
+ * @state: selinux_state
*
- * NOTE: This function must be called with policy_mutex held.
+ * On success returns the configuration settings string.
+ * On error, returns NULL.
*/
-void selinux_ima_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state)
+static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+ const char *on = "=1;", *off = "=0;";
+ char *buf;
+ int buf_len, i;
+
+ /*
+ * Size of the following string including the terminating NULL char
+ * initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;
+ */
+ buf_len = 42;
+ for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++)
+ buf_len += strlen(selinux_policycap_names[i]) + 3;
+
+ buf = kzalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return NULL;
+
+ strscpy(buf, "initialized", buf_len);
+ strlcat(buf, selinux_initialized(state) ? on : off, buf_len);
+
+ strlcat(buf, "enforcing", buf_len);
+ strlcat(buf, enforcing_enabled(state) ? on : off, buf_len);
+
+ strlcat(buf, "checkreqprot", buf_len);
+ strlcat(buf, checkreqprot_get(state) ? on : off, buf_len);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) {
+ strlcat(buf, selinux_policycap_names[i], buf_len);
+ strlcat(buf, state->policycap[i] ? on : off, buf_len);
+ }
+
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_ima_measure_state_locked - Measure SELinux state and hash of policy
+ *
+ * @state: selinux state struct
+ */
+void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(struct selinux_state *state)
{
+ char *state_str = NULL;
void *policy = NULL;
size_t policy_len;
int rc = 0;
+ WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+ state_str = selinux_ima_collect_state(state);
+ if (!state_str) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed to read state.\n", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-state",
+ state_str, strlen(state_str), false);
+
+ kfree(state_str);
+
/*
* Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed.
*/
@@ -42,3 +97,17 @@ void selinux_ima_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state)
vfree(policy);
}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_ima_measure_state - Measure SELinux state and hash of policy
+ *
+ * @state: selinux state struct
+ */
+void selinux_ima_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+ WARN_ON(mutex_is_locked(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+ mutex_lock(&state->policy_mutex);
+ selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(state);
+ mutex_unlock(&state->policy_mutex);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/ima.h b/security/selinux/include/ima.h
index d69c36611423..75ca92b4a462 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/ima.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/ima.h
@@ -15,10 +15,16 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
extern void selinux_ima_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state);
+extern void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(
+ struct selinux_state *selinux_state);
#else
static inline void selinux_ima_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state)
{
}
+static inline void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(
+ struct selinux_state *selinux_state)
+{
+}
#endif
#endif /* _SELINUX_IMA_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 4bde570d56a2..26ec58593ba1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#include "security.h"
#include "objsec.h"
#include "conditional.h"
+#include "ima.h"
enum sel_inos {
SEL_ROOT_INO = 2,
@@ -182,6 +183,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
selinux_status_update_setenforce(state, new_value);
if (!new_value)
call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
+
+ selinux_ima_measure_state(state);
}
length = count;
out:
@@ -762,6 +765,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
checkreqprot_set(fsi->state, (new_value ? 1 : 0));
length = count;
+
+ selinux_ima_measure_state(fsi->state);
+
out:
kfree(page);
return length;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 2106b5d383e7..cb2866489363 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2179,7 +2179,7 @@ static void selinux_notify_policy_change(struct selinux_state *state,
selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
- selinux_ima_measure_state(state);
+ selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(state);
}
void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state,
--
2.30.0
On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 11:49 AM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> SELinux stores the configuration state and the policy capabilities
> in kernel memory. Changes to this data at runtime would have an impact
> on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring this data
> through IMA subsystem provides a tamper-resistant way for
> an attestation service to remotely validate it at runtime.
>
> Measure the configuration state and policy capabilities by calling
> the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data().
>
> To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
>
> 1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
> to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
> For example,
> BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data
>
> 2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy
> measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux
>
> Sample measurement of SELinux state and policy capabilities:
>
> 10 2122...65d8 ima-buf sha256:13c2...1292 selinux-state 696e...303b
>
> Execute the following command to extract the measured data
> from the IMA's runtime measurements list:
>
> grep "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p
>
> The output should be a list of key-value pairs. For example,
> initialized=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;
>
> To verify the measurement is consistent with the current SELinux state
> reported on the system, compare the integer values in the following
> files with those set in the IMA measurement (using the following commands):
>
> - cat /sys/fs/selinux/enforce
> - cat /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
> - cat /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities/[capability_file]
>
> Note that the actual verification would be against an expected state
> and done on a separate system (likely an attestation server) requiring
> "initialized=1;enforcing=1;checkreqprot=0;"
> for a secure state and then whatever policy capabilities are actually
> set in the expected policy (which can be extracted from the policy
> itself via seinfo, for example).
>
> Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>
> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
> ---
> security/selinux/ima.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> security/selinux/include/ima.h | 6 +++
> security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 6 +++
> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +-
> 4 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ima.c b/security/selinux/ima.c
> index 03715893ff97..5c7f73cd1117 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ima.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ima.c
> @@ -13,18 +13,73 @@
> #include "ima.h"
>
> /*
> - * selinux_ima_measure_state - Measure hash of the SELinux policy
> + * selinux_ima_collect_state - Read selinux configuration settings
> *
> - * @state: selinux state struct
> + * @state: selinux_state
> *
> - * NOTE: This function must be called with policy_mutex held.
> + * On success returns the configuration settings string.
> + * On error, returns NULL.
> */
> -void selinux_ima_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state)
> +static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(struct selinux_state *state)
> +{
> + const char *on = "=1;", *off = "=0;";
> + char *buf;
> + int buf_len, i;
> +
> + /*
> + * Size of the following string including the terminating NULL char
> + * initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;
> + */
> + buf_len = 42;
It might be safer over the long term, and self-documenting, to do the
following instead:
buf_len = strlen("initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;") + 1;
> + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++)
> + buf_len += strlen(selinux_policycap_names[i]) + 3;
's/3/strlen(on)/' or is that too much?
> +
> + buf = kzalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!buf)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + strscpy(buf, "initialized", buf_len);
I wonder if it might be a good idea to add a WARN_ON() to the various
copies, e.g.:
rc = strXXX(...);
WARN_ON(rc);
The strscpy/strlcat protections should ensure that nothing terrible
happens with respect to wandering off the end of the string, or
failing to NUL terminate, but they won't catch a logic error where the
string is not allocated correctly (resulting in a truncated buffer).
> + strlcat(buf, selinux_initialized(state) ? on : off, buf_len);
> +
> + strlcat(buf, "enforcing", buf_len);
> + strlcat(buf, enforcing_enabled(state) ? on : off, buf_len);
> +
> + strlcat(buf, "checkreqprot", buf_len);
> + strlcat(buf, checkreqprot_get(state) ? on : off, buf_len);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) {
> + strlcat(buf, selinux_policycap_names[i], buf_len);
> + strlcat(buf, state->policycap[i] ? on : off, buf_len);
> + }
> +
> + return buf;
> +}
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com
On 2/10/21 4:25 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 11:49 AM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> SELinux stores the configuration state and the policy capabilities
>> in kernel memory. Changes to this data at runtime would have an impact
>> on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring this data
>> through IMA subsystem provides a tamper-resistant way for
>> an attestation service to remotely validate it at runtime.
>>
>> Measure the configuration state and policy capabilities by calling
>> the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data().
>>
>> To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
>>
>> 1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
>> to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
>> For example,
>> BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data
>>
>> 2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy
>> measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux
>>
>> Sample measurement of SELinux state and policy capabilities:
>>
>> 10 2122...65d8 ima-buf sha256:13c2...1292 selinux-state 696e...303b
>>
>> Execute the following command to extract the measured data
>> from the IMA's runtime measurements list:
>>
>> grep "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p
>>
>> The output should be a list of key-value pairs. For example,
>> initialized=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;
>>
>> To verify the measurement is consistent with the current SELinux state
>> reported on the system, compare the integer values in the following
>> files with those set in the IMA measurement (using the following commands):
>>
>> - cat /sys/fs/selinux/enforce
>> - cat /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
>> - cat /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities/[capability_file]
>>
>> Note that the actual verification would be against an expected state
>> and done on a separate system (likely an attestation server) requiring
>> "initialized=1;enforcing=1;checkreqprot=0;"
>> for a secure state and then whatever policy capabilities are actually
>> set in the expected policy (which can be extracted from the policy
>> itself via seinfo, for example).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>
>> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
>> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> security/selinux/ima.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>> security/selinux/include/ima.h | 6 +++
>> security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 6 +++
>> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +-
>> 4 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/ima.c b/security/selinux/ima.c
>> index 03715893ff97..5c7f73cd1117 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/ima.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/ima.c
>> @@ -13,18 +13,73 @@
>> #include "ima.h"
>>
>> /*
>> - * selinux_ima_measure_state - Measure hash of the SELinux policy
>> + * selinux_ima_collect_state - Read selinux configuration settings
>> *
>> - * @state: selinux state struct
>> + * @state: selinux_state
>> *
>> - * NOTE: This function must be called with policy_mutex held.
>> + * On success returns the configuration settings string.
>> + * On error, returns NULL.
>> */
>> -void selinux_ima_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state)
>> +static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(struct selinux_state *state)
>> +{
>> + const char *on = "=1;", *off = "=0;";
>> + char *buf;
>> + int buf_len, i;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Size of the following string including the terminating NULL char
>> + * initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;
>> + */
>> + buf_len = 42;
>
> It might be safer over the long term, and self-documenting, to do the
> following instead:
>
> buf_len = strlen("initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;") + 1;
Since the string is fixed I hard coded the length to avoid runtime
overhead. But I agree on self-documenting and safety. Will update.
>
>> + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++)
>> + buf_len += strlen(selinux_policycap_names[i]) + 3;
>
> 's/3/strlen(on)/' or is that too much?
Since this is in a loop, I'll do strlen("on") once outside the loop and
use the value instead of hard coded "3".
>
>> +
>> + buf = kzalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!buf)
>> + return NULL;
>> +
>> + strscpy(buf, "initialized", buf_len);
>
> I wonder if it might be a good idea to add a WARN_ON() to the various
> copies, e.g.:
>
> rc = strXXX(...);
> WARN_ON(rc);
Agreed - will do.
> The strscpy/strlcat protections should ensure that nothing terrible
> happens with respect to wandering off the end of the string, or
> failing to NUL terminate, but they won't catch a logic error where the
> string is not allocated correctly (resulting in a truncated buffer).
agreed - Will add WARN_ON(rc) for all the str calls.
thanks,
-lakshmi
>
>> + strlcat(buf, selinux_initialized(state) ? on : off, buf_len);
>> +
>> + strlcat(buf, "enforcing", buf_len);
>> + strlcat(buf, enforcing_enabled(state) ? on : off, buf_len);
>> +
>> + strlcat(buf, "checkreqprot", buf_len);
>> + strlcat(buf, checkreqprot_get(state) ? on : off, buf_len);
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) {
>> + strlcat(buf, selinux_policycap_names[i], buf_len);
>> + strlcat(buf, state->policycap[i] ? on : off, buf_len);
>> + }
>> +
>> + return buf;
>> +}
>