by Peter Collingbourne

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/6] fs: use copy_from_user_nolog() to copy mount() data

On Thu, Dec 9, 2021 at 6:59 PM Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 9 Dec 2021 at 22:42, Peter Collingbourne <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > > With uaccess logging the contract is that the kernel must not report
> > > > accessing more data than necessary, as this can lead to false positive
> > > > reports in downstream consumers. This generally works out of the box
> > > > when instrumenting copy_{from,to}_user(), but with the data argument
> > > > to mount() we use copy_from_user() to copy PAGE_SIZE bytes (or as
> > > > much as we can, if the PAGE_SIZE sized access failed) and figure out
> > > > later how much we actually need.
> > > >
> > > > To prevent this from leading to a false positive report, use
> > > > copy_from_user_nolog(), which will prevent the access from being logged.
> > > > Recall that it is valid for the kernel to report accessing less
> > > > data than it actually accessed, as uaccess logging is a best-effort
> > > > mechanism for reporting uaccesses.
> > > >
> > > > Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I5629b92a725c817acd9a861288338dd605cafee6
> > > > Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <[email protected]>
> > > > ---
> > > > fs/namespace.c | 8 +++++++-
> > > > 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> > > > index 659a8f39c61a..8f5f2aaca64e 100644
> > > > --- a/fs/namespace.c
> > > > +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> > > > @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
> > > > #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
> > > > #include <linux/fs_context.h>
> > > > #include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
> > > > +#include <linux/uaccess-buffer.h>
> > > >
> > > > #include "pnode.h"
> > > > #include "internal.h"
> > > > @@ -3197,7 +3198,12 @@ static void *copy_mount_options(const void __user * data)
> > > > if (!copy)
> > > > return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> > > >
> > > > - left = copy_from_user(copy, data, PAGE_SIZE);
> > > > + /*
> > > > + * Use copy_from_user_nolog to avoid reporting overly large accesses in
> > > > + * the uaccess buffer, as this can lead to false positive reports in
> > > > + * downstream consumers.
> > > > + */
> > > > + left = copy_from_user_nolog(copy, data, PAGE_SIZE);
> > >
> > > A late idea...
> > > Maybe it's better to log them with a new UACCESS_BUFFER_FLAG_OVERREAD
> > > flag. Better for user-space, at least can detect UAFs by checking the
> > > first byte. And a more logical kernel annotation (maybe will be used
> > > in some other tools? or if we ever check user tags in the kernel).
> > >
> > > Probably not too important today since we use this only in 2 places,
> > > but longer term may be better.
> >
> > I'm not sure about this. The overreads are basically an implementation
> > detail of the kernel, so I'm not sure it makes sense to expose them. A
> > scheme where we expose all overreads wouldn't necessarily help with
> > UAF, because what if for example the kernel reads *behind* the
> > user-provided pointer? I guess it could lead to false positives.
>
> If user-space uses logging to check addressability, then it can safely
> check only the first byte (right? there must be at least 1 byte passed
> by user-space at that address). And that's enough to detect UAFs.

I was thinking more e.g. what if the kernel reads an entire page with
copy_from_user() and takes a subset of it later. Then the first byte
could point to some other random allocation in the same page and lead
to a false UAF report if we just consider the first byte.

So I think the use cases for accesses with this flag set may be
limited to things like fuzzers.

> > > Btw, what's the story with BPF accesses? Can we log them theoretically?
> > >
> > > Previously the comment said:
> > >
> > > + /*
> > > + * Avoid copy_from_user() here as it may leak information about the BPF
> > > + * program to userspace via the uaccess buffer.
> > > + */
> > >
> > > but now it says something very generic:
> > >
> > > /*
> > > * Avoid logging uaccesses here as the BPF program may not be following
> > > * the uaccess log rules.
> > > */
> >
> > Yes we should be able to log them theoretically, but we don't need to
> > do that now. See my reply here:
> >
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAMn1gO5B5Q3hfN6kugv2wmdFGNhJb75iRX1zmCkw3wnueN1dtg@mail.gmail.com/#:~:text=This%20comment%20was,the%20comment%20accordingly.
>
> I see. These could be marked with another flag.
> I don't have a strong opinion about this. But I am mentioning this
> because my experience is that it's better to expose more raw info from
> kernel in these cases, rather than hardcoding policies into kernel
> code (what's ignored/why/when) b/c a delay from another kernel change
> to wide deployment is 5+ years and user-space code may need to detect
> and deal with all various versions of the kernel logic.
> Say, fuzzing may still want to know about the mount options (rather
> than no signal that the kernel reads at least something at that
> address). But adding them later with a flag is not really a backwards
> compatible change b/c you now have addressability checking code that's
> not checking the new flag and will produce false positives.

I think this is a good point. I'll see about adding flags for the BPF
and overread cases.

Peter

2021-12-10 04:23:30

by Dmitry Vyukov

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/6] fs: use copy_from_user_nolog() to copy mount() data

On Fri, 10 Dec 2021 at 05:02, Peter Collingbourne <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Thu, 9 Dec 2021 at 22:42, Peter Collingbourne <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > > > With uaccess logging the contract is that the kernel must not report
> > > > > accessing more data than necessary, as this can lead to false positive
> > > > > reports in downstream consumers. This generally works out of the box
> > > > > when instrumenting copy_{from,to}_user(), but with the data argument
> > > > > to mount() we use copy_from_user() to copy PAGE_SIZE bytes (or as
> > > > > much as we can, if the PAGE_SIZE sized access failed) and figure out
> > > > > later how much we actually need.
> > > > >
> > > > > To prevent this from leading to a false positive report, use
> > > > > copy_from_user_nolog(), which will prevent the access from being logged.
> > > > > Recall that it is valid for the kernel to report accessing less
> > > > > data than it actually accessed, as uaccess logging is a best-effort
> > > > > mechanism for reporting uaccesses.
> > > > >
> > > > > Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I5629b92a725c817acd9a861288338dd605cafee6
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <[email protected]>
> > > > > ---
> > > > > fs/namespace.c | 8 +++++++-
> > > > > 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> > > > > index 659a8f39c61a..8f5f2aaca64e 100644
> > > > > --- a/fs/namespace.c
> > > > > +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> > > > > @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
> > > > > #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
> > > > > #include <linux/fs_context.h>
> > > > > #include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
> > > > > +#include <linux/uaccess-buffer.h>
> > > > >
> > > > > #include "pnode.h"
> > > > > #include "internal.h"
> > > > > @@ -3197,7 +3198,12 @@ static void *copy_mount_options(const void __user * data)
> > > > > if (!copy)
> > > > > return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> > > > >
> > > > > - left = copy_from_user(copy, data, PAGE_SIZE);
> > > > > + /*
> > > > > + * Use copy_from_user_nolog to avoid reporting overly large accesses in
> > > > > + * the uaccess buffer, as this can lead to false positive reports in
> > > > > + * downstream consumers.
> > > > > + */
> > > > > + left = copy_from_user_nolog(copy, data, PAGE_SIZE);
> > > >
> > > > A late idea...
> > > > Maybe it's better to log them with a new UACCESS_BUFFER_FLAG_OVERREAD
> > > > flag. Better for user-space, at least can detect UAFs by checking the
> > > > first byte. And a more logical kernel annotation (maybe will be used
> > > > in some other tools? or if we ever check user tags in the kernel).
> > > >
> > > > Probably not too important today since we use this only in 2 places,
> > > > but longer term may be better.
> > >
> > > I'm not sure about this. The overreads are basically an implementation
> > > detail of the kernel, so I'm not sure it makes sense to expose them. A
> > > scheme where we expose all overreads wouldn't necessarily help with
> > > UAF, because what if for example the kernel reads *behind* the
> > > user-provided pointer? I guess it could lead to false positives.
> >
> > If user-space uses logging to check addressability, then it can safely
> > check only the first byte (right? there must be at least 1 byte passed
> > by user-space at that address). And that's enough to detect UAFs.
>
> I was thinking more e.g. what if the kernel reads an entire page with
> copy_from_user() and takes a subset of it later. Then the first byte
> could point to some other random allocation in the same page and lead
> to a false UAF report if we just consider the first byte.

Humm.. good point. As I said I am not strong about this. I don't know
what's the right answer.

> So I think the use cases for accesses with this flag set may be
> limited to things like fuzzers.
>
> > > > Btw, what's the story with BPF accesses? Can we log them theoretically?
> > > >
> > > > Previously the comment said:
> > > >
> > > > + /*
> > > > + * Avoid copy_from_user() here as it may leak information about the BPF
> > > > + * program to userspace via the uaccess buffer.
> > > > + */
> > > >
> > > > but now it says something very generic:
> > > >
> > > > /*
> > > > * Avoid logging uaccesses here as the BPF program may not be following
> > > > * the uaccess log rules.
> > > > */
> > >
> > > Yes we should be able to log them theoretically, but we don't need to
> > > do that now. See my reply here:
> > >
> > > https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAMn1gO5B5Q3hfN6kugv2wmdFGNhJb75iRX1zmCkw3wnueN1dtg@mail.gmail.com/#:~:text=This%20comment%20was,the%20comment%20accordingly.
> >
> > I see. These could be marked with another flag.
> > I don't have a strong opinion about this. But I am mentioning this
> > because my experience is that it's better to expose more raw info from
> > kernel in these cases, rather than hardcoding policies into kernel
> > code (what's ignored/why/when) b/c a delay from another kernel change
> > to wide deployment is 5+ years and user-space code may need to detect
> > and deal with all various versions of the kernel logic.
> > Say, fuzzing may still want to know about the mount options (rather
> > than no signal that the kernel reads at least something at that
> > address). But adding them later with a flag is not really a backwards
> > compatible change b/c you now have addressability checking code that's
> > not checking the new flag and will produce false positives.
>
> I think this is a good point. I'll see about adding flags for the BPF
> and overread cases.
>
> Peter