On Thu, 19 Aug 2021 17:46:39 +0200,
Takashi Iwai wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> it seems that the recent fixes in bluetooth tree address most of
> issues in CVE-2021-3640 ("Use-After-Free vulnerability in function
> sco_sock_sendmsg()"). But there is still a problem left: although we
> cover the race with lock_sock() now, the lock may be blocked endlessly
> (as the task takes over with userfaultd), which result in the trigger
> of watchdog like:
>
> -- 8< --
> [ 23.226767][ T7] Bluetooth: hci0: command 0x0419 tx timeout
> [ 284.985881][ T1529] INFO: task poc:7603 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
> [ 284.989134][ T1529] Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4+ #48
> [ 284.990098][ T1529] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
> [ 284.991705][ T1529] task:poc state:D stack:13784 pid: 7603 ppid: 7593 flags:0x00000000
> [ 284.993414][ T1529] Call Trace:
> [ 284.994025][ T1529] __schedule+0x32e/0xb90
> [ 284.994842][ T1529] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x72/0xe0
> [ 284.995987][ T1529] schedule+0x38/0xe0
> [ 284.996723][ T1529] __lock_sock+0xa1/0x130
> [ 284.997434][ T1529] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
> [ 284.998150][ T1529] lock_sock_nested+0x9f/0xb0
> [ 284.998914][ T1529] sco_conn_del+0xb1/0x1a0
> [ 284.999619][ T1529] ? sco_conn_del+0x1a0/0x1a0
> [ 285.000361][ T1529] sco_disconn_cfm+0x3a/0x60
> [ 285.001116][ T1529] hci_conn_hash_flush+0x95/0x130
> [ 285.001921][ T1529] hci_dev_do_close+0x298/0x680
> [ 285.002687][ T1529] ? up_write+0x12/0x130
> [ 285.003367][ T1529] ? vhci_close_dev+0x20/0x20
> [ 285.004107][ T1529] hci_unregister_dev+0x9f/0x240
> [ 285.004886][ T1529] vhci_release+0x35/0x70
> [ 285.005602][ T1529] __fput+0xdf/0x360
> [ 285.006225][ T1529] task_work_run+0x86/0xd0
> [ 285.006927][ T1529] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x267/0x270
> [ 285.007824][ T1529] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60
> [ 285.008694][ T1529] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xa0
> [ 285.009393][ T1529] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> [ 285.010321][ T1529] RIP: 0033:0x4065c7
> -- 8< --
>
> Is there any plan to address this?
>
> As a quick hack, I confirmed a workaround like below:
>
> -- 8< --
> --- a/net/core/sock.c
> +++ b/net/core/sock.c
> @@ -2628,7 +2628,7 @@ void __lock_sock(struct sock *sk)
> prepare_to_wait_exclusive(&sk->sk_lock.wq, &wait,
> TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
> spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_lock.slock);
> - schedule();
> + schedule_timeout(msecs_to_jiffies(10 * 1000));
> spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_lock.slock);
> if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
> break;
> -- 8< --
>
> .... but I'm not sure whether it's the right way to go.
Does anyone has an idea?
thanks,
Takashi
Hi Takashi,
On Thu, Aug 26, 2021 at 3:29 AM Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 19 Aug 2021 17:46:39 +0200,
> Takashi Iwai wrote:
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > it seems that the recent fixes in bluetooth tree address most of
> > issues in CVE-2021-3640 ("Use-After-Free vulnerability in function
> > sco_sock_sendmsg()"). But there is still a problem left: although we
> > cover the race with lock_sock() now, the lock may be blocked endlessly
> > (as the task takes over with userfaultd), which result in the trigger
> > of watchdog like:
> >
> > -- 8< --
> > [ 23.226767][ T7] Bluetooth: hci0: command 0x0419 tx timeout
> > [ 284.985881][ T1529] INFO: task poc:7603 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
> > [ 284.989134][ T1529] Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4+ #48
> > [ 284.990098][ T1529] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
> > [ 284.991705][ T1529] task:poc state:D stack:13784 pid: 7603 ppid: 7593 flags:0x00000000
> > [ 284.993414][ T1529] Call Trace:
> > [ 284.994025][ T1529] __schedule+0x32e/0xb90
> > [ 284.994842][ T1529] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x72/0xe0
> > [ 284.995987][ T1529] schedule+0x38/0xe0
> > [ 284.996723][ T1529] __lock_sock+0xa1/0x130
> > [ 284.997434][ T1529] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
> > [ 284.998150][ T1529] lock_sock_nested+0x9f/0xb0
> > [ 284.998914][ T1529] sco_conn_del+0xb1/0x1a0
> > [ 284.999619][ T1529] ? sco_conn_del+0x1a0/0x1a0
> > [ 285.000361][ T1529] sco_disconn_cfm+0x3a/0x60
> > [ 285.001116][ T1529] hci_conn_hash_flush+0x95/0x130
> > [ 285.001921][ T1529] hci_dev_do_close+0x298/0x680
> > [ 285.002687][ T1529] ? up_write+0x12/0x130
> > [ 285.003367][ T1529] ? vhci_close_dev+0x20/0x20
> > [ 285.004107][ T1529] hci_unregister_dev+0x9f/0x240
> > [ 285.004886][ T1529] vhci_release+0x35/0x70
> > [ 285.005602][ T1529] __fput+0xdf/0x360
> > [ 285.006225][ T1529] task_work_run+0x86/0xd0
> > [ 285.006927][ T1529] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x267/0x270
> > [ 285.007824][ T1529] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60
> > [ 285.008694][ T1529] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xa0
> > [ 285.009393][ T1529] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> > [ 285.010321][ T1529] RIP: 0033:0x4065c7
> > -- 8< --
> >
> > Is there any plan to address this?
> >
> > As a quick hack, I confirmed a workaround like below:
> >
> > -- 8< --
> > --- a/net/core/sock.c
> > +++ b/net/core/sock.c
> > @@ -2628,7 +2628,7 @@ void __lock_sock(struct sock *sk)
> > prepare_to_wait_exclusive(&sk->sk_lock.wq, &wait,
> > TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
> > spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_lock.slock);
> > - schedule();
> > + schedule_timeout(msecs_to_jiffies(10 * 1000));
> > spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_lock.slock);
> > if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
> > break;
> > -- 8< --
> >
> > .... but I'm not sure whether it's the right way to go.
>
> Does anyone has an idea?
It seems that we need to rework some code so the functions affected by
userfaultfd are not used with sock_lock held.
--
Luiz Augusto von Dentz