Return-Path: From: Vinicius Costa Gomes To: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org Cc: Anderson Briglia , Vinicius Costa Gomes Subject: [bluetooth-next 03/15] Bluetooth: simple SMP pairing negotiation Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2011 22:51:44 -0300 Message-Id: <1302054716-24534-4-git-send-email-vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> In-Reply-To: <1302054716-24534-1-git-send-email-vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> References: <1302054716-24534-1-git-send-email-vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> Sender: linux-bluetooth-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: From: Anderson Briglia This implementation only exchanges SMP messages between the Host and the Remote. No keys are being generated. TK and STK generation will be provided in further patches. Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes --- include/net/bluetooth/smp.h | 17 +++++++ net/bluetooth/smp.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h index 36bdd6e..111853a 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h @@ -38,6 +38,23 @@ struct smp_cmd_pairing { __u8 resp_key_dist; } __packed; +#define SMP_IO_DISPLAY_ONLY 0x00 +#define SMP_IO_DISPLAY_YESNO 0x01 +#define SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_ONLY 0x02 +#define SMP_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT 0x03 +#define SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY 0x04 + +#define SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT 0x00 +#define SMP_OOB_PRESENT 0x01 + +#define SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY 0x01 +#define SMP_DIST_ID_KEY 0x02 +#define SMP_DIST_SIGN 0x04 + +#define SMP_AUTH_NONE 0x00 +#define SMP_AUTH_BONDING 0x01 +#define SMP_AUTH_MITM 0x04 + #define SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM 0x03 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm { __u8 confirm_val[16]; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 8b67a56..373e2f3 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -64,6 +64,94 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data) hci_send_acl(conn->hcon, skb, 0); } +static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data; + + BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + + skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); + + rp->io_capability = 0x00; + rp->oob_flag = 0x00; + rp->max_key_size = 16; + rp->init_key_dist = 0x00; + rp->resp_key_dist = 0x00; + rp->auth_req &= (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(*rp), rp); +} + +static void smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp; + + BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + + memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp); +} + +static void smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); + + if (conn->hcon->out) { + struct smp_cmd_pairing_random random; + + memset(&random, 0, sizeof(random)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(random), + &random); + } else { + struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm confirm; + + memset(&confirm, 0, sizeof(confirm)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(confirm), + &confirm); + } +} + +static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct smp_cmd_pairing_random cp; + + BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); + + skb_pull(skb, sizeof(cp)); + + if (conn->hcon->out) { + /* FIXME: start encryption */ + } else { + memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(cp), &cp); + } +} + +static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data; + struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; + + BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + + skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); + memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); + + cp.io_capability = 0x00; + cp.oob_flag = 0x00; + cp.max_key_size = 16; + cp.init_key_dist = 0x00; + cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00; + cp.auth_req = rp->auth_req & (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); +} + int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level) { __u8 authreq; @@ -114,24 +202,33 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) switch (code) { case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ: - reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; - smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason), - &reason); - err = -EOPNOTSUPP; + smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb); break; case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL: break; case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP: + smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb); + break; + + case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ: + smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb); + break; + case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM: + smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb); + break; + case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM: + smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb); + break; + case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO: case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT: case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO: case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO: - case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ: default: BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code); -- 1.7.4.1