Return-Path: Message-ID: <55014D38.4040506@ubnt.com> Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 10:24:24 +0200 From: Andrejs Hanins MIME-Version: 1.0 To: lukasz.rymanowski@tieto.com CC: Stefan Seyfried , "linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org" , Luiz Augusto von Dentz Subject: Re: [PATCH] core/gatt-database: Fix memory corruption References: <550043CD.7080202@ubnt.com> <550052CA.20407@ubnt.com> <5500B15B.9090508@message-id.googlemail.com> In-Reply-To: <5500B15B.9090508@message-id.googlemail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Sender: linux-bluetooth-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Hi Lukasz, On 2015.03.11. 23:19, Stefan Seyfried wrote: > Am 11.03.2015 um 15:35 schrieb Andrejs Hanins: >> Pointer to on-stack variable was returned from pending_write_new. > > I still get a crash in the tests when running with memory debugging > enabled (which is default in openSUSE Build Service): > > $> MALLOC_CHECK_=3 MALLOC_PERTURB_=69 unit/test-gatt > > /TP/GAC/CL/BV-01-C - init > /TP/GAC/CL/BV-01-C - setup > [...] > /TP/GAR/CL/BV-01-C - setup complete > /TP/GAR/CL/BV-01-C - run > /TP/GAR/CL/BV-01-C - test passed > Segmentation fault > > Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. > 0x000055555558cb70 in bt_att_send (att=0x4000000f300432d, opcode=opcode@entry=24 '\030', > pdu=pdu@entry=0x7fffffff4a0f, length=length@entry=1, > callback=callback@entry=0x55555558fc30 , user_data=0x5555557b1ca0, > destroy=destroy@entry=0x0) at src/shared/att.c:1135 > 1135 if (!att || !att->io) > (gdb) bt > #0 0x000055555558cb70 in bt_att_send (att=0x4000000f300432d, opcode=opcode@entry=24 '\030', > pdu=pdu@entry=0x7fffffff4a0f, length=length@entry=1, > callback=callback@entry=0x55555558fc30 , user_data=0x5555557b1ca0, > destroy=destroy@entry=0x0) at src/shared/att.c:1135 > #1 0x0000555555591039 in cancel_long_write_req (client=, req=) > at src/shared/gatt-client.c:1791 Lukasz, I think there is some "missed-ref" problem related to the code you have recently added to the gatt-client/cancel_request() to cancel long_write and prep_write. Namely, bt_att_cancel can actually free the request which is later on accessed as req->long_write and req->prep_write thus reading free'd memory. Valgrind shows it happens this way: Address 0x5a06fa8 is 8 bytes inside a block of size 40 free'd at 0x4C2B200: free (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) by 0x415BC0: request_unref (gatt-client.c:160) <<------ this one frees the request which is accessed later in cancel_request() by 0x410BB3: cancel_att_send_op (att.c:222) by 0x412700: bt_att_cancel (att.c:1194) by 0x418EC0: cancel_request (gatt-client.c:1852) by 0x421C91: queue_remove_all (queue.c:387) by 0x418F53: bt_gatt_client_cancel_all (gatt-client.c:1866) by 0x418601: bt_gatt_client_free (gatt-client.c:1569) by 0x418A65: bt_gatt_client_unref (gatt-client.c:1692) by 0x4021FB: destroy_context (test-gatt.c:284) by 0x40230C: context_quit (test-gatt.c:312) by 0x4031AC: test_read_cb (test-gatt.c:677) I can't instantly figure out the proper fix (add_ref to the request in the beginning of cancel_request() to avoid preliminary free?), hopefully it will be easier for you, as you are the author of the original code. Probably there are also other similar issues elsewhere. > #2 0x00005555555910ab in cancel_request (data=0x5555557b1e80) at src/shared/gatt-client.c:1855 > #3 0x0000555555597903 in queue_remove_all (queue=, function=function@entry=0x0, > user_data=user_data@entry=0x0, destroy=destroy@entry=0x555555591060 ) > at src/shared/queue.c:387 > #4 0x00005555555917cd in bt_gatt_client_cancel_all (client=client@entry=0x5555557b36f0) > at src/shared/gatt-client.c:1866 > #5 0x0000555555591839 in bt_gatt_client_free (client=0x5555557b36f0) at src/shared/gatt-client.c:1569 > #6 0x0000555555589439 in destroy_context (context=0x5555557b1bb0) at unit/test-gatt.c:284 > #7 context_quit (user_data=0x5555557b1bb0) at unit/test-gatt.c:312 > #8 0x000055555558d59b in handle_rsp (pdu_len=, pdu=0x5555557c6571 "\001\002\003\001)", > opcode=11 '\v', att=0x5555557b2e90) at src/shared/att.c:640 > #9 can_read_data (io=, user_data=0x5555557b2e90) at src/shared/att.c:813 > #10 0x0000555555596ec5 in watch_callback (channel=, cond=, > user_data=) at src/shared/io-glib.c:170 > #11 0x00007ffff7b198e5 in g_main_context_dispatch () from /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0 > #12 0x00007ffff7b19c48 in ?? () from /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0 > #13 0x00007ffff7b19f0a in g_main_loop_run () from /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0 > #14 0x000055555558c031 in tester_run () at src/shared/tester.c:830 > #15 0x0000555555587e19 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffdc58) at unit/test-gatt.c:3182 > > Valgrind also complains loudly: > $> valgrind unit/test-gatt > /dev/null > ==20817== Memcheck, a memory error detector > ==20817== Copyright (C) 2002-2013, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. > ==20817== Using Valgrind-3.10.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info > ==20817== Command: unit/test-gatt > ==20817== > ==20817== Syscall param socketcall.bind(my_addr.sa_data) points to uninitialised byte(s) > ==20817== at 0x522A737: bind (in /lib64/libc-2.21.so) > ==20817== by 0x14BBC2: ecb_aes_setup (crypto.c:110) > ==20817== by 0x14BBC2: bt_crypto_new (crypto.c:148) > ==20817== by 0x140788: bt_att_new (att.c:937) > ==20817== by 0x13EA4B: create_context.constprop.24 (test-gatt.c:592) > ==20817== by 0x13F2E2: run_callback (tester.c:412) > ==20817== by 0x4E808E4: g_main_context_dispatch (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x4E80C47: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x4E80F09: g_main_loop_run (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x140030: tester_run (tester.c:830) > ==20817== by 0x13BE18: main (test-gatt.c:3182) > ==20817== Address 0xffeff6aa8 is on thread 1's stack > ==20817== in frame #1, created by bt_crypto_new (crypto.c:141) > ==20817== This one looks like a Valgrind bug. It probably does not take into account, that sockaddr passed to the bind is not a 'struct sockaddr' but actually a 'struct sockaddr_alg' of different size. The code, as such, does proper initialization. > ==20817== Syscall param socketcall.bind(my_addr.sa_data) points to uninitialised byte(s) > ==20817== at 0x522A737: bind (in /lib64/libc-2.21.so) > ==20817== by 0x14BC4B: cmac_aes_setup (crypto.c:132) > ==20817== by 0x14BC4B: bt_crypto_new (crypto.c:161) > ==20817== by 0x140788: bt_att_new (att.c:937) > ==20817== by 0x13EA4B: create_context.constprop.24 (test-gatt.c:592) > ==20817== by 0x13F2E2: run_callback (tester.c:412) > ==20817== by 0x4E808E4: g_main_context_dispatch (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x4E80C47: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x4E80F09: g_main_loop_run (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x140030: tester_run (tester.c:830) > ==20817== by 0x13BE18: main (test-gatt.c:3182) > ==20817== Address 0xffeff6aa8 is on thread 1's stack > ==20817== in frame #1, created by bt_crypto_new (crypto.c:141) > ==20817== > ==20817== Invalid read of size 1 > ==20817== at 0x145076: cancel_request (gatt-client.c:1854) > ==20817== by 0x14B902: queue_remove_all (queue.c:387) > ==20817== by 0x1457CC: bt_gatt_client_cancel_all (gatt-client.c:1866) > ==20817== by 0x145838: bt_gatt_client_free (gatt-client.c:1569) > ==20817== by 0x13D438: destroy_context (test-gatt.c:284) > ==20817== by 0x13D438: context_quit (test-gatt.c:312) > ==20817== by 0x14159A: handle_rsp (att.c:640) > ==20817== by 0x14159A: can_read_data (att.c:813) > ==20817== by 0x14AEC4: watch_callback (io-glib.c:170) > ==20817== by 0x4E808E4: g_main_context_dispatch (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x4E80C47: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x4E80F09: g_main_loop_run (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x140030: tester_run (tester.c:830) > ==20817== by 0x13BE18: main (test-gatt.c:3182) > ==20817== Address 0x5a13908 is 8 bytes inside a block of size 40 free'd > ==20817== at 0x4C2A37C: free (in /usr/lib64/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) > ==20817== by 0x140F1E: cancel_att_send_op (att.c:222) > ==20817== by 0x140F1E: bt_att_cancel (att.c:1200) > ==20817== by 0x145075: cancel_request (gatt-client.c:1852) > ==20817== by 0x14B902: queue_remove_all (queue.c:387) > ==20817== by 0x1457CC: bt_gatt_client_cancel_all (gatt-client.c:1866) > ==20817== by 0x145838: bt_gatt_client_free (gatt-client.c:1569) > ==20817== by 0x13D438: destroy_context (test-gatt.c:284) > ==20817== by 0x13D438: context_quit (test-gatt.c:312) > ==20817== by 0x14159A: handle_rsp (att.c:640) > ==20817== by 0x14159A: can_read_data (att.c:813) > ==20817== by 0x14AEC4: watch_callback (io-glib.c:170) > ==20817== by 0x4E808E4: g_main_context_dispatch (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x4E80C47: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x4E80F09: g_main_loop_run (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== > ==20817== Invalid read of size 1 > ==20817== at 0x14507C: cancel_request (gatt-client.c:1857) > ==20817== by 0x14B902: queue_remove_all (queue.c:387) > ==20817== by 0x1457CC: bt_gatt_client_cancel_all (gatt-client.c:1866) > ==20817== by 0x145838: bt_gatt_client_free (gatt-client.c:1569) > ==20817== by 0x13D438: destroy_context (test-gatt.c:284) > ==20817== by 0x13D438: context_quit (test-gatt.c:312) > ==20817== by 0x14159A: handle_rsp (att.c:640) > ==20817== by 0x14159A: can_read_data (att.c:813) > ==20817== by 0x14AEC4: watch_callback (io-glib.c:170) > ==20817== by 0x4E808E4: g_main_context_dispatch (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x4E80C47: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x4E80F09: g_main_loop_run (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x140030: tester_run (tester.c:830) > ==20817== by 0x13BE18: main (test-gatt.c:3182) > ==20817== Address 0x5a13909 is 9 bytes inside a block of size 40 free'd > ==20817== at 0x4C2A37C: free (in /usr/lib64/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) > ==20817== by 0x140F1E: cancel_att_send_op (att.c:222) > ==20817== by 0x140F1E: bt_att_cancel (att.c:1200) > ==20817== by 0x145075: cancel_request (gatt-client.c:1852) > ==20817== by 0x14B902: queue_remove_all (queue.c:387) > ==20817== by 0x1457CC: bt_gatt_client_cancel_all (gatt-client.c:1866) > ==20817== by 0x145838: bt_gatt_client_free (gatt-client.c:1569) > ==20817== by 0x13D438: destroy_context (test-gatt.c:284) > ==20817== by 0x13D438: context_quit (test-gatt.c:312) > ==20817== by 0x14159A: handle_rsp (att.c:640) > ==20817== by 0x14159A: can_read_data (att.c:813) > ==20817== by 0x14AEC4: watch_callback (io-glib.c:170) > ==20817== by 0x4E808E4: g_main_context_dispatch (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x4E80C47: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== by 0x4E80F09: g_main_loop_run (in /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0.4200.1) > ==20817== > ==20817== > ==20817== HEAP SUMMARY: > ==20817== in use at exit: 29,640 bytes in 618 blocks > ==20817== total heap usage: 36,545 allocs, 35,927 frees, 1,585,464 bytes allocated > ==20817== > ==20817== LEAK SUMMARY: > ==20817== definitely lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks > ==20817== indirectly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks > ==20817== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks > ==20817== still reachable: 29,640 bytes in 618 blocks > ==20817== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks > ==20817== Rerun with --leak-check=full to see details of leaked memory > ==20817== > ==20817== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v > ==20817== Use --track-origins=yes to see where uninitialised values come from > ==20817== ERROR SUMMARY: 358 errors from 4 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0) > > Unfortunately, my understanding of the code did not allow me > to fis this :-( > > Best regards, > > Stefan >