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Subject: Re: [PATCH V3] Bluetooth: rfcomm: Fix null-ptr-deref in
 rfcomm_check_security
From: patchwork-bot+bluetooth@kernel.org
Message-Id: 
 <170473682437.30343.8024937175045116311.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 08 Jan 2024 18:00:24 +0000
References: <20240103091043.3379363-1-20373622@buaa.edu.cn>
In-Reply-To: <20240103091043.3379363-1-20373622@buaa.edu.cn>
To: Yuxuan-Hu <20373622@buaa.edu.cn>
Cc: marcel@holtmann.org, johan.hedberg@gmail.com, luiz.dentz@gmail.com,
 linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
 baijiaju1990@gmail.com, sy2239101@buaa.edu.cn, pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de

Hello:

This patch was applied to bluetooth/bluetooth-next.git (master)
by Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>:

On Wed,  3 Jan 2024 17:10:43 +0800 you wrote:
> During our fuzz testing of the connection and disconnection process at the
> RFCOMM layer, we discovered this bug. By comparing the packets from a
> normal connection and disconnection process with the testcase that
> triggered a KASAN report. We analyzed the cause of this bug as follows:
> 
> 1. In the packets captured during a normal connection, the host sends a
> `Read Encryption Key Size` type of `HCI_CMD` packet
> (Command Opcode: 0x1408) to the controller to inquire the length of
> encryption key.After receiving this packet, the controller immediately
> replies with a Command Completepacket (Event Code: 0x0e) to return the
> Encryption Key Size.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [V3] Bluetooth: rfcomm: Fix null-ptr-deref in rfcomm_check_security
    https://git.kernel.org/bluetooth/bluetooth-next/c/6ec00b0737fe

You are awesome, thank you!
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