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From:   Luis Ressel <aranea@aixah.de>
To:     selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] services/ssh: Don't audit accesses from ssh_t to /dev/random
Date:   Sat, 27 Oct 2018 14:47:03 +0200
Message-Id: <20181027124703.2283-1-aranea@aixah.de>
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OpenSSL 1.1 always opens both /dev/urandom and /dev/random, which
generates spurious denial messages for ssh_t, ssh_keygen_t and probably
various other domains too.

The code only uses /dev/random as a fallback and can cope with an open()
failure just fine, so I'm dontauditing the access. However, I don't have
strong feelings about this -- if someone would prefer to allow these
accesses instead, I'd be okay with that too.
---
 policy/modules/services/ssh.te | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
index 092fe422..4e37a264 100644
--- a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
+++ b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_ssh_port(ssh_t)
 corenet_sendrecv_ssh_client_packets(ssh_t)
 
 dev_read_urand(ssh_t)
+dev_dontaudit_read_rand(ssh_t)
 
 fs_getattr_all_fs(ssh_t)
 fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ssh_t)
@@ -352,6 +353,7 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ssh_keygen_t)
 
 dev_read_sysfs(ssh_keygen_t)
 dev_read_urand(ssh_keygen_t)
+dev_dontaudit_read_rand(ssh_keygen_t)
 
 term_dontaudit_use_console(ssh_keygen_t)
 
-- 
2.19.1