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Subject: Re: [PATCH] services/ssh: Don't audit accesses from ssh_t to
 /dev/random
To:     Luis Ressel <aranea@aixah.de>, selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org
References: <20181027124703.2283-1-aranea@aixah.de>
From:   Chris PeBenito <pebenito@ieee.org>
Message-ID: <6a7039f5-9dc4-aa7d-c990-bd098726ed3f@ieee.org>
Date:   Sat, 27 Oct 2018 15:10:51 -0400
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On 10/27/2018 08:47 AM, Luis Ressel wrote:
> OpenSSL 1.1 always opens both /dev/urandom and /dev/random, which
> generates spurious denial messages for ssh_t, ssh_keygen_t and probably
> various other domains too.
> 
> The code only uses /dev/random as a fallback and can cope with an open()
> failure just fine, so I'm dontauditing the access. However, I don't have
> strong feelings about this -- if someone would prefer to allow these
> accesses instead, I'd be okay with that too.
> ---
>   policy/modules/services/ssh.te | 2 ++
>   1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
> index 092fe422..4e37a264 100644
> --- a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
> +++ b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
> @@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_ssh_port(ssh_t)
>   corenet_sendrecv_ssh_client_packets(ssh_t)
>   
>   dev_read_urand(ssh_t)
> +dev_dontaudit_read_rand(ssh_t)
>   
>   fs_getattr_all_fs(ssh_t)
>   fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ssh_t)
> @@ -352,6 +353,7 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ssh_keygen_t)
>   
>   dev_read_sysfs(ssh_keygen_t)
>   dev_read_urand(ssh_keygen_t)
> +dev_dontaudit_read_rand(ssh_keygen_t)
>   
>   term_dontaudit_use_console(ssh_keygen_t)

Merged.

-- 
Chris PeBenito